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RADIATION INJURIES AND TIME LIMITATIONS IN
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION CASESt

Samuel D. Estep* and Walter R. Allan**
I.

INTRODUCTION

HE increasing use of radioactive materials and radiation-producing devices in industry and elsewhere makes it clear that
injuries from exposure to radiation must be anticipated. It becomes
relevant, therefore, to inquire into the extent to which the present
workmen's compensation statutes will be able to cope with the
injuries which may arise from the use of this new source of energy.
Perhaps the many rules relating to the compensability of a
particular claim can be summed up in a single sentence: an employee has a compensable claim if he suffers disability or loss of
earning capacity from an injury or occupational disease which arises out of and in the course of employment. The various aspects
of this seemingly simple test have fathered much litigation. Moreover, the applicability of the traditional rules to radiation injuries
and diseases is not clear. These problems have been discussed to
some extent elsewhere.1 One problem which has not received sufficient attention, however, is that raised under limitation provisions
found in all compensation acts. Even if a claim meets the required
tests of compensability, an employee still must act according to the
requirements of the period of limitations section of the statute. The
present discussion will focus upon these requirements. 2
The period of limitations sections of workmen's compensation
statutes generally set up requirements of notice of the injury to
the employer and of filing a claim for compensation with the workmen's compensation agency within a certain time. Notice to the
employer is usually required "as soon as practicable" or within a
set period of time. Similarly, the claim must be filed with some state
agency within a defined period of time. The general nature of the
limitations problems raised by radiation-induced conditions is apparent when their singular character is considered. Dr. G. Failla
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of Columbia University has described the delayed biological effects
of radiation:
"It is the latent period which makes the problem of protection extremely complicated, because the worst effects may
not appear until twenty-five or thirty years later. To predict
the dose today that would produce effects, or rather would
not produce effects, twenty-five years later is quite a problem...." 3
But the peculiar problems raised by radiation-induced conditions cannot really be appreciated without an understanding of the
operation of present workmen's compensation systems. Each state,
of course, has its own workmen's compensation act and no two acts
are exactly alike. Nevertheless, certain general principles pervade
the field; hence, an examination of these principles, followed by a
more detailed examination of the various periods of limitations,
is essential.
Compensation coverage generally is provided for "accidental
injury" and "occupational disease." These terms have received
most intensive consideration with respect to the question of precisely what conditions may be compensable.4 Theoretically, coverage can be separated from limitations periods, but this terminology
is often carried over into the period of limitations sections of the
acts and it seems desirable to make a few preliminary remarks about
the use of these terms. Some jurisdictions require that an "accident"
be an identifiable event which is unexpected and easily located in
time. Others require only that the result to the employee be unusual. In some states occupational diseases are listed on schedules
and a particular disease is compensable only if it appears on
the list. If provision is made for general coverage of occupational
diseases, inclusion of particular diseases has been left to the agencies
and to the judiciary.
The categorization of certain radiation-induced conditions as
either "accident" or "disease" may create two critical problems.
First, the categorization itself may be difficult. For example, exposure to radiation may result in the deterioration of bone tissue.15
In a jurisdiction which requires that there be a sudden event for
an "accident," such an injury would seem not compensable under
3 Failla, Biological Effects of Radiation, AEC, TID-388, March 12, 1951, pp. 65-66.
4 See 1 LARsoN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ch. VII (1952) [hereinafter cited as LARsoN].
5 Specific injuries which -may result from exposure to radiation are listed in ATOMS
AND THE LAW 26-35.
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this category. Whether or not a court would be able or willing to
classify it as a disease remains to be determined. Often it will not
fit neatly into either category. Second, in regard to the period of
limitations, different rules have developed governing the periods
for "accident" and for "disease." It should be kept in mind that
these rules, which are discussed below, are applied after the court
makes its initial decision as to categorization. Hence, the category
chosen may well determine if the employee has met the period of
limitations and thus whether or not compensation will be granted.
A preliminary word is also in order about the requirement, if
any, that the employee know of his condition before the statute
will start to run. The courts and commentators are often not entirely clear on this subject, yet it is a critical consideration in cases
of latent and slow-developing injuries. In many states, statutes have
been framed requiring varying degrees of employee knowledge. 6
In the absence of such statutory language, the courts seem to have
formulated three different tests. First, some say that the statute will
run from the date of the event or events which produced the condition for which compensation is claimed. 7 Under this test, of course,
there is no requirement of knowledge of any sort. Second, a number
of courts have spoken of the statute running from the date upon
which the employee became disabled or could have recovered compensation. 8 Again, no employee knowledge is required, since it is
entirely conceivable that a latent injury or disease could prevent
an employee from working without making him aware of the fact
that the employment induced the condition. Third, many courts
have stated that the statute will not run until the employee is unable to work and is, or reasonably should be, aware of the causal
relation of his condition to his employment. 9 This approach provides the most complete protection to the employee.
Unfortunately, many opinions do not make it clear precisely
what approach the court is taking. Often the courts seem to be fol6
7

See Part II(A)(2)(d) infra.
E.g., Lewis v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., 159 Pa. Super. 226, 48 A.2d 120 (1946),

discussed in text accompanying note 17 infra.
8 E.g., Free v. Associated Indem. Corp., 78 Ga. App. 839, 844-45, 52 S.E.2d 325, 329-30
(1949); Gagne v. Weintraub's Silk & Fabric Shops, Inc., 80 R.I. 498, 500, 98 A.2d 854, 855
(1953).
o E.g., Marsh v. Industrial Comm'n, 217 Cal. 338, 351, 18 P.2d 933, 938 (1933); Burcham
v. Carbon & Carbide Chems. Corp., 188 Tenn. 592, 603, 221 S.W.2d 888, 892 (1949). A subsidiary, but not unimportant, problem is whether the employee must be aware of the
relation to a particular employment or only to employment in general. This does not seem
to have received much consideration. See Bucuk v. Edward A. Zusi Brass Foundry, 49 N.J.
Super. 187, 139 A.2d 436 (1958), discussed in text accompanying note 82 infra.
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lowing a fourth test by declaring that the statute runs from the date
upon which an employee has knowledge of his "condition.'' 10 This
"test" is ambiguous and actually must be one of the last two mentioned. On the one hand, it may require only that an employee
have knowledge of the fact that he is not able to work. Naturally
if the employee is not working he will be a'ware of that fact, yet he
may not be aware of the causal connection to employment. On the
other hand, it may require that the employee also know that his
condition is causally related to his employment. If the reference is
made to knowledge of a "compensable" condition, it would seem
that an employee must be aware of the causal relation to employment to know that the condition is compensable. Nonetheless, it
is possible to interpret this phrase to mean only that the employee
must be aware of a condition which is in fact compensable, with
no requirement that he know that it is compensable.11
Care must be used in determining what degree of knowledge
a court requires. The context of the statement may be of assistance
in determining the exact meaning of the words used.12 In any event,
courts and commentators should be urged to use more precise
terminology.
The following discussion of specific limitations problems will
be seen in better perspective if these two matters of categorization
and employee knowledge are kept constantly in mind. Three prob10 E.g., Wheeler v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 328 Mo. 888, 894, 42 S.W.2d 579, 581 (1931);
Anderson v. Contract Trucking Co., 48 N.M. 158, 163, 146 P.2d 837, 876 (1944); Roschak
v. Vulcan Iron Works, 157 Pa. Super. 227, 234-35, 42 A.2d 280, 283 (1945).
11 E.g., Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp. v. Byrd, 215 Miss. 235, 247-48, 60 So. 2d 645, 650-51
(1952). See 2 LARsoN § 78.42(a), at 263, in which it is stated: "Under the 'injury' type of
statute, there is now almost complete judicial agreement that the claim period runs from
the time compensable injury becomes apparent." In 2 LARSON § 78.41, at 260, the statement is made that "the time for notice or claim does not begin to run until the claimant,
as a reasonable man, should recognize the nature, seriousness and probable compensable
character of his injury or disease." Larson also states that the period will not start "until
by reasonable care and diligence it is discoverable and apparent that a compensable in•
jury has been sustained.'' Id. at 261.
12 E.g., Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp. v. Byrd, supra note 11, at 247-48, 60 So. 2d at 650-51
(The court refers to "knowledge of compensable disability"; the actual reference date
employed is that of a letter from a doctor containing the "first information that the nature
and manner of the work had caused the paralysis.''); Roschak v. Vulcan Iron Works, 157
Pa. Super. 227, 234-35, 42 A.2d 280, 283 (The court states that the statute runs from the
date upon which "the employee is disabled and definitely knows he is disabled by the
occupational disease.'' It then cites extensively from a California decision which set up
the date upon which "by exercise of reasonable care and diligence it is discoverable and
apparent that a compensable injury was sustained in the performance of the duties of an
employee..• .''). But see, e.g., Anderson v. Contract Trucking Co., 48 N.M. 158, 163, 146
P.2d 873, 876 (1944), in which the court refers to the starting date of the period of limitations as both the date upon which "the disability can be ascertained and the duty to pay
compensation arises" and as the date upon which "the employee knows, or by due care
and diligence is presumed to know, that he has an occupational disease.''
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lems will be discussed separately: (1) claim filing requirements, for
both accidental injuries and occupational diseases; (2) over-all cutoff provisions, and (3) tolling of the statutory period. However,
these problems have some relationship to each other and cannot be
analyzed adequately without an appreciation of this interrelationship and of the pervasive character of the problems of categorization and employee knowledge. After these concepts have been
discussed in general terms, their specific applicability to radiation
injuries will be analyzed and some suggestions will be made about
what action should be taken by the states to adapt limitations
provisions to the demands of radiation cases.

II. EXISTING STATUTORY SYSTEMS
A. Claim Filing Requirements
I. Accidental Injuries
In general. Periods for the filing of claims for injury from accident run either from the date of the "accident" or of the "injury."
In cases of latent conditions which develop long after exposure to
an injurious source, recovery is generally dependent upon which of
the two provisions is in effect. "Accident" statutes have been given
narrow interpretations, while those utilizing "injury" have been
read more broadly.
The broad interpretation generally given to "injury" is
illustrated by Hartford Acc. b Indem. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n. 18
In that case the employee had been struck on the lip in 1931 and
a cyst developed which was removed the following year. In 1933,
a cancerous growth developed and was removed. The employee
then filed a claim for disfigurement. The Arizona statute required
that a claim be filed "within one year after the day upon which
the injury occurred." 14 The court said:
"We ... hold that the claim must be filed within one year
after the date of the injury if the injury is of sufficient magnitude to be compensable. But, if it is slight or trivial at the
time and noncompensable and later develops unexpected results for which the employee could not have been expected to
make a claim and receive compensation, then the statute runs,
not from the date of the accident, but from the date the results
of the injury become manifest and compensable." 115
43 Ariz. 50, 29 P.2d 142 (1934).
The present Arizona statute provides the same period. Aruz. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 231061(D) (1956). See also discussion in text accompanying note 123 infra.
111 43 Ariz. 50, 55-56, 29 P.2d 142, 143-44 (1934).
18
14
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Among the twenty-two states which utilize the date of the "accident," however, all but one have given the term an interpretation
which makes recovery for latent conditions seem doubtful.1 6 The
Pennsylvania case of Lewis v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp. 11 illustrates this problem. Muriatic acid had splashed in the employee's
eye while he was working for the employer in 1933, but blindness
attributable to the acid did not develop until 1938. Regardless of
the fact that the employee had suffered no compensable condition
on which to base his claim, the court held that the date of the accident was in 1933 and that the claim was therefore barred by the
one-year statute of limitations. The court felt that "the statutory
limitations in§ 315 [applied] to the cause of action (the splashing
of the muriatic acid into the left eye), and not to the extent of the
injury (the loss of sight of that eye)." 18
In framing provisions dating from the time of the "accident,"
legislatures probably had in mind an identifiable event causing an
identifiable injury which the employee could easily report. But
two other situations are possible. As in the Lewis case, the employee
may suffer an "accident" which apparently is not serious but which
later gives rise to a compensable condition. In such a case, compensation will generally be denied in "accident" jurisdictions if the
latent condition emerges after expiration of the statutory period,
which will run from the date of the event which gave rise to the
condition. 19 On the other hand, if the employee does not even know
that there has been an "accident," it is not clear what approach will
be taken. The Kentucky court has indicated that compensation
should be granted in such a case.20 However, it should be noted
here that the United States Supreme Court, interpreting the "injury" provisions of the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers Act
narrowly to mean "accidental event," expressly reserved judgment
on the question of latent conditions arising from an unidentifiable
event.21 Although the Oklahoma court also interprets the "injury"
statute narrowly, it did approve holdings in earlier cases which
See 2 LARSON § 78.42.
159 Pa. Super. 226, 48 A.2d 120 (1946).
18 Id. at 228, 48 A.2d at 122 (parenthetical explanation by the court).
19 E.g., Central Locomotive 8: Car Works v. Industrial Comm'n, 290 Ill. 436, 125 N.E.
369 (1919); Fiorella v. Clark, 298 Ky. 817, 184 S.W.2d 208 (1944); Whitted v. Palmer-Bee
Co., 228 N.C. 447, 46 S.E.2d 109 (1948); Lewis v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., 159 Pa. Super
226, 48 A.2d 120 (1946).
20 Turner Co. v. Morris, 267 Ky. 217, 101 S.W.2d 921 (1937); Crutcher Dental Depot
v. Miller, 251 Ky. 201, 64 S.W.2d 466 (1933).
21 Pillsbury v. United Eng'r Co., 342 U.S. 197 (1952).
16

17
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stated that the statute did not run until a compensable condition
arose from an unidentifiable event.22
If no identifiable event occurs and the employee is to be barred
for not filing notice and claim, he is faced with an impossible task
if the condition remains latent. If a seemingly trivial event occurs
the situation is not really much different. Even if the employee
morbidly considered all contingencies, it is doubtful that he could
file an anticipatory claim and avoid the bar of the statute.23 It has
been pointed out by a leading commentator that "accident" provisions as interpreted are not true statutes of limitations but more
like conditions precedent to substantive statutory rights. 24 A statute
of limitations is designed to block "stale" claims. Yet, a claim based
on a condition which develops after the statute has expired cannot
be deemed stale. Any argument for cutting off claims for manifested
injuries must be based on considerations of fairness to the employer. As the time lapse increases, the possibility of intervening
cause and the difficulties of proof increase. But the employee, too,
deserves to be treated fairly and, as pointed out above, a great deal
of time may elapse between exposure to radiation and the development of a compensable condition.
In any event, Nebraska alone has adopted the view that "accident" may be read as the time at which the employee suffers the
compensable condition. 25 The legislative trend, for some reason,
has been to replace the broader "injury" provisions with those referring to "accident."26 In one state, the change was effected judicially.27
The Indiana legislature has recognized accidental conditions
induced by radiation as a special category. The statute provides:
"The right to compensation ... shall be forever barred unless within two years after the occurrence of the accident ... a
claim for compensation thereunder shall be filed with the Industrial Board: Provided, however, That in all cases wherein
an accident or death results from the exposure to radiation a
22 Tulsa Hotel v. Spaks, 200 Okla. 636, 198 P.2d 652 (1948), reversing Brown & Root
v. Dunkelberger, 196 Okla. 116, 162 P.2d 1018 (1945), and approving Bartlett-Collins Co. v.
Roach, 180 Okla. 521, 71 P.2d 489 (1937) and Swift & Co. v. State Industrial Comm'n, 161
Okla. 132, 17 P.2d 435 (1932).
23 There seems to be no authority on the point-probably because it has never been
attempted. Most statutes refer to filing claims for compensation, and if no compensation is
due, it seems doubtful that an anticipatory claim could be filed. See 2 LARSON § 78.44.
24 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COlllP.ENSATION § 2355 (1960) (hereinafter cited as SCHNEIDER].
25 E.g., Keenan v. Consumers Pub. Power Dist., 152 Neb. 54, 40 N.W.2d 261 (1949).
20 California, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, and Utah.
27 Oklahoma. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.

266

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

claim for compensation shall be filed with the Industrial Board
within two years from the date on which the employee had
knowledge of his injury or by exercise of reasonable diligence
should have known of the existence of such injury and its
causal relationship to his employment."28
This statute, if coupled with similar provisions for diseases
caused by exposure to radiation, would seem to provide fairly adequate periods for the filing of claims for radiation-induced conditions.29
Other jurisdictions have special provisions for some latent injuries.30 The chief objections to these statutes are (1) failure to
provide adequate coverage31 and (2) failure to provide an adequate
period.32
Massachusetts and Texas have broad provisions allowing excuse
for late filing on a showing of "good cause." In Massachusetts, a
failure to discover work connection was deemed "good cause"88 and
a delay of seven years was held not to prejudice the employer.84
Coverage of Disease Under "Accidental Injury" Statutes. The
question of whether or not a disease may be considered an "accidental injury" has been discussed in detail in other works.85 For
purposes of applying limitations provisions, however, it is important to remember that some jurisdictions require that an "accidental injury" be caused by a sudden or traumatic event, while
others will treat a slowly developing disease as an accidental injury
in various circumstances. Treatment of diseases under the period
of limitations section of the statutes seems largely dependent upon
whether a jurisdiction employs "accident" or "injury" provisions.
As noted before, under "injury" statutes the general tendency
has been for courts to interpret the time period as running from the
date upon which the condition develops. This view has also been
followed when recovery is permitted for diseases under accidental
injury provisions. Typically the employee must be able to discern
IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-1224 (Supp. 1963).
The Indiana statute relating to radiation-induced conditions is of questionable workability. See statute and text discussion at note 97 infra.
80 See LA. R.Ev• .STAT. § 23:1209 (1950); N.Y. WoRKMEN's CoMP. LAw § 28. These statutes
are set out and discussed in ATOMS AND THE LAw 835-36.
31 The New York statute covers only "bone, blood or lung changes or malignancies."
N.Y. WoRKMEN's CoMP. LA.w § 28.
82 The Louisiana statute requires filing within two years.
38 MASS. LAws ANN. ch. 152, § 49 (1957). See Wheaton's Case, 310 Mass. 504, 38 N.E.2d
617 (1941).
34 Morris Gaffer's Case, 279 Mass. 566, 181 N.E. 763 (1932).
85 1 LARsoN §§ 39-40; ATOMS AND THE LA.w 786-90.
28

29
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to some degree the nature of his condition,86 although to what extent realization of "work-connection" is required is not clear.87
Some interesting problems which are likely to occur under
"accident" provisions are illustrated in the Alabama decision in
Birmingham Elec. Co. v. Meacham, 88 because Alabama provides
no coverage for radiation-induced diseases as such.89 The employee
in this case developed a tubercular condition caused by exposure
in employment to methyl chloride gas from early March to July 27,
1928. He did not become aware of the nature of his condition until
July 25, 1929, and then filed a claim for compensation. The court
first categorized the employee's condition as an uncompensable occupational disease. It then proceeded in dictum to declare that any
"injuries" which the employee might have received before July 25,
1928, would in any event be barred by the one year statute of limitations. In Alabama, therefore, it would seem that even if a radiation-induced disease could be deemed the result of an accident,
the statute of limitations would run on each individual exposure
that the employee may have suffered. If the disease manifested itself after the expiration of the statute on all exposures there would,
of course, be no recovery. And, in the case of disease due to cumulative exposures,40 the employee would face the virtually impossible
task of proving what portion, if any, of the disease was compensable.
Such results, with varying degrees of harshness,41 seem likely in
those jurisdictions in which the statute runs from the date of the
condition-inducing event. In regard to "gradually developing injuries," Professor Larson has suggested that the period should begin to run on the date upon which the "disability manifests itself."42
Such a result would seem possible in an "accident" jurisdiction
only if a strict view of accident is abandoned insofar as the statute
of limitations section of the act is. concerned. Since numerous courts
have found an "accident" in the culmination or manifestation of
so See cases cited at 2 LARsoN § 78.41 n.25.
Larson speaks of reasonable recognition of the "nature, seriousness and probable
compensable character of his injury or diseases." 2 LARsoN § 78.41, at 260.
88 27 Ala. App. 471, 175 So. 316, cert. denied, 234 Ala. 506, 175 So. 322 (1937).
89 At the time of this case Alabama provided no coverage for occupational diseases as
such. Presently, the Alabama act lists only "occupational pneumonoconiosis" as a compensable disease. AI.A. CoDE tit. 26, §§ 313(1)-313(16) (1958).
40 If a number of exposures were required to cause a single condition, then that condition might not be compensable. If a number of exposures merely added to the seriousness
of the condition, then part of that condition might be compensable.
n Qualification is necessary for those jurisdictions which may find an "accident" in,
for example, a sudden unexpected exposure to the disease-causing source. See generally
1 LlRSON §§ 39-40.
42 1 l.AJtsoN § 39.50.
87
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a condition for purposes of coverage,43 there seems no logical reason
why this interpretation could not be extended to the period of
limitations usage of the term "accident."

2. Occupational Disease
Provisions relating to notice and claim for occupational diseases
are not as easily categorized as are those pertaining to injury by accident. Nevertheless, although statutory language varies widely, judicial interpretation has resulted in the development of some fairly
consistent patterns of coverage. Expressly by statute or by judicial
decision in a number of states, the statute runs from the date upon
which the employee became disabled and knew, or should have
known, the causal relation to his employment. In other states, the
statute runs from the date of disability, it being not clear whether
knowledge of causal relation is necessary. Still other states utilize
the time of last exposure or the date of termination of the employment in which the employee was exposed. Often the statutes list
alternative dates on which the statute may start to run. A number
of states have, in addition to other provisions, an over-all cutoff
date requiring that the disease emerge or a claim be filed within
a certain period of time, typically measured from the date of last
exposure or termination of employment in which the employee
was exposed. In addition to periods for "ordinary" occupational
diseases, a number of states in recent years have passed special provisions covering radiation diseases and sometimes other diseases of
a latent character.
a. Statute Runs From "Disablement" or "Disability"
The right to compensation generally arises when the employee
suffers a disabling condition as defined by the statute.44 With these
provisions in mind, many legislatures have provided that the period
of limitations will begin to run when an employee suffers "disaibility,"45 "disablement," 46 or becomes "disabled." 47 This eliminates
the possibility that the statutory period may run while the condition is still latent, but it leaves open the question of whether or not
the employee must in fact be aware of the cause of his condition.

43 See I LARsoN §§ 39-40.
44 See 2 LARsoN § 57 .00.
45 Colorado, Maryland, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island.
46 Arizona, Illinois, Indiana, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, South
Dakota, and Vermont.
47 Oregon.
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Most courts which have faced the question say that he must be.
The Maryland statute provides:
"If no claim for disability or death from an occupational
disease be filed with the Workmen's Compensation Commission within one (1) year from the date of disablement or death,
as the case may be, the right to compensation for such disease
shall be forever barred.... " 48
The Maryland court has given this statute a broad reading. In
Consolidation Coal Co. v. Porter4 9 an employee quit his job in 1944.
He had been continually exposed to sand dust and suffered from
chest pains, cough, sputum, loss of appetite, and slight loss of
weight. In 1947 his condition was diagnosed as silicosis and he filed
claim for compensation. He had been unable to carry on a remunerative occupation since 1945. In upholding the claim, the court said:

"[L]imitations as to notice to the employer, and as to the
time of filing the claim, ... started to run in this occupational
disease case from the time the employee or someone in his
behalf knew or had reason to believe that he was suffering
from an occupational disease and that there was a causal connection between his disability and occupation." 50
This case is of particular interest because of the analogy it provides for radiation cases. The employee quit work because of illness,
he suffered a number of symptoms of disease, and he was unable to
work for a long period of time. Yet, the court held that the statute
did not run until the employee "had reason to believe" that he had
an occupational disease and that it was related to the employment.
Apparently the facts present were not sufficient to give the employee such notice.
Similar results have been achieved in other jurisdictions which
utilize the date of the occurrence of a disabling condition to start
the statute. When faced directly with the problem, most courts
have adopted a liberal approach to the question of employee knowledge, although the lack of precision of language noted above has
been present in some opinions. 51 The Ohio Supreme Court, however, has expressed open disagreement with the interpretation that
the employee must have some degree of knowledge. That court declared in dictum that the question of a claimant's delay in filing a
48
40
50
111

l\fo. ANN. CODE art. IOI, § 26(a) (1957).
192 Md. 494, 64 A.2d 715 (1948).
Id. at 506, 64 A.2d at 721.
See cases cited notes 11 & 12 supra.
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claim is "a matter about which this court is not informed nor permitted to concern itself." 52 And the Illinois court, in fixing the date
upon which the period of limitations began to run, defined "disablement" strictly as "the event of becoming disabled from earning full wages in the employment which exposed the employee to
the occupational disease, or from earning wages at other employment," although the question of employee knowledge was not
squarely before the court.53
Three other states have adopted language similar to that referring to a disabling condition. The Tennessee and Maine statutes
run from the date of "incapacity"54 and that of Utah from the time
at which "the cause of action arises." 55 The courts of Tennessee and
Utah have indicated their acceptance of a broad interpretation
similar to that applied by the Maryland court.56
In North Carolina, judicial interpretation has brought about
some variations in the application of the general provisions. The
statute is similar to that of Maryland, which provides that "the
right to compensation for occupational disease shall be barred unless a claim be filed with the Industrial Commission within one
year after death, disability or disablement as the case may be." 57
The North Carolina court has held that this claim provision
must be read together with that for notice to the employer which
provides: "The time of notice of an occupational disease shall run
from the date that the employee has been advised by competent
medical authority that he has same." 58 The court has stated that
"disablement" in the claim provision is also to be read as the date
upon which the employee was informed by "a competent medical
authority" that he has an occupational disease.59 Such a reading
provides a more definite date upon which to base the filing of the
claim. It should also be noted that the court has not been inclined
to second-guess claimants on what amounts to reasonable notice
from a medical authority of the existence of such disease. 60
52 State ex rel. Raymond v. Industrial Comm'n, 140 Ohio St. 233, 235, 42 N.E.2d 992,
993 (1942). The Ohio Court of Appeals has squarely held this to be the law. State ex rel.
Willis v. Industrial Comm'n, 105 Ohio App. 187, 152 N.E.2d 440 (1958).
53 Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 401 Ill. 382, 386, 82 N.E.2d 449,
450 (1948).
54 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 31, § 63 (1954); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1108 (1955). The
Maine statute provides an alternative based on knowledge.
55 UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-2-48 (1953).
56 Whitehead v. Holston Defense Corp., 205 Tenn. 326, 326 S.W.2d 482 (1959); State
Ins. Fund v. Industrial Comm'n, 116 Utah 279, 209 P .2d 558 (1949).
57 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-58(c) (1958).
58 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-58(b) (1958).
59 Duncan v. Carpenter, 233 N.C. 422, 64 S.E.2d 410 (1951).
60 Singleton v. D. T. Vance Mica Co., 235 N.C. 315, 69 S.E.2d 707 (1952).
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b. Statute Runs From the "Manifestation" of
Symptoms or Disease
A few states have provided that the period of limitations will
begin to run when the disease, or the symptoms thereof, become
manifest. 61 The Connecticut statute provides:
"No proceedings, for compensation under the provisions
of this act shall be maintained unless written notice of claim
for compensation is given within one year ... from the first
manifestation of a symptom of the occupational disease ....
For the purposes of this section, 'manifestation of a symptom'
means its manifestation to the employee claiming compensation, or to some other person standing in such relation to him
that the knowledge of such person would be imputed to him,
in such manner as is or ought to be recognized by him as
symptomatic of the occupational disease for which compensation is claimed." 62
This is better than having the statute run from the date upon
which the disabling condition occurs because of the possibility that
an employee might be disabled yet be unaware of the occupational
nature of the cause. As has been pointed out, however, no court
has held directly that "disablement" statutes should be interpreted
with such literalness.
The Connecticut court has examined the additional question
of whether or not the claimant must be aware of the occupational
source of his disease before the statute starts to run, and it held that
not only must the employee be aware of the symptom itself, but he
must also have a reasonable opportunity to know that it is the symptom of a particular occupational disease. 68
A recent Kentucky enactment provides that a claim must be
filed "within one year after the last injurious exposure to the occupational hazard or after the employe first experiences a distinct
manifestation of an occupational disease, ... whichever shall last
occur." 64 This statute has the commendable feature of not cutting
off an employee's claim after an arbitrary period unless he has some
degree of knowledge of his condition. On the other hand, apparently the employee who knows both of his condition and its
connection with employment could continue working and not file
Connecticut, Kentucky, Louisiana, and Texas.
62 Public Act 491, § 16 (1961). This is a re-enactment of the statutory language of
repealed CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-157, 31-168 (1958).
os Bremner v. Marc Eidlitz &: Son, Inc., 118 Conn. 666, 174 All. 172 (1934).
64 KY. REv. STAT. § 342.316 (1960).
01
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his claim until exposure ceased, as the exposure would thus be
"last" to occur. If this is so, it would appear that the Kentucky legislature has gone too far in its reaction to provisions which in some
cases were unfair to the employee.
c. Statute Runs From the Date of Diagnosis or Date on Which the
Employee Was Informed by a Physician That He Had an
Occupational Disease

A few states have provided that the statute will run from the
date of diagnosis of the disease 65 or the date upon which the employee is informed by a physician that he has an occupational
disease. 66 All of these states except Washington provide alternative
periods. 67
Washington is the only state in which judicial consideration
has been given to these provisions. The Washington statute provides that "claims [for occupational disease] to be valid and compensable must be filed within one year following the date claimant
has notice from a physician of his occupational disease." 68 The court
has held that mere notice to the employee that he suffers from a
disease is not sufficient; the employee must be informed by the
physician that his disease is causally related to employment. 00 Moreover, the statute will not run until the condition is compensable. 70
These rules may be unduly considerate of the employee if they
are read to require actual notice of causal relation by a physician.
It is entirely conceivable, even if not probable, that the doctor
would not be aware of the employee's occupation and thus would
be unable to inform the employee _of the causal relation, but the
employee himself would have sufficient information to be aware
of the fact that he suffered a work-connected injury. In such a case
a reasonable standard seems more desirable.
Although not strictly within this narrow category, two states
have attempted novel approaches which, because of the use of similar terminology, may be examined here. A recent Oklahoma enactment provides:
65 Virginia. Claim filing requirements were recently removed for cases involving radiation-induced diseases. VA. CODE ANN. § 65-49 (Supp. 1962).
66 Ohio, Oregon, and Washington.
67 Ohio (disability), Oregon (disability), Virginia (manifestation of symptom).
68 WASH. REv. CODE § 51.08.140 (1949). The wording was changed slightly in 1961, but
not so as to change the meaning on this point. WASH. REv. CODE § 51.28.055 (1961).
69 Nygaard v. Department of Labor & Indus., 51 Wash. 2d 659, 321 P.2d 257 (1958);
Williams v. Department of Labor & Indus., 45 Wash. 2d 574, 277 P.2d 338 (1954).
70 Nygaard v. Department of Labor & Indus., supra note 69.
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"The right to claim compensation under this Act shall be
forever barred unless within one (I) year after the injury or
death, a claim for compensation thereunder shall be filed with
the Commission. . . . Provided . . . with respect to radiation
disease ... the right to claim compensation under this Act
shall be forever barred unless a claim is filed within one (I)
year after the last hazardous exposure or within one (I) year
after the disease first becomes manifest by a symptom or condition from which one learned in medicine could with reasonable accuracy diagnose this specific disease." 71
Instead of "reasonableness" o:r:i the part of the employee, the
test employed is that of a reasonable diagnosis by "one learned in
medicine." An employee may become ill but still reasonably not
discern the nature of his illness. If he fails to go to a doctor or if
his doctor negligently fails to diagnose the disease, then the employee is apparently barred if the claim is filed more than a year
after "one learned in medicine" could have reasonably diagnosed
the disease. 72 In effect the statute charges the employee with a duty
to visit a doctor and to be certain that the doctor is not negligent
in his diagnosis. It is perhaps arguable that an employee ought to
visit a doctor when he feels ill. It seems less arguable that he ought
to be required to double-check the doctor's diagnosis. Even the
first proposition seems less tenable if the "symptom" by which the
disease becomes "manifest" to "one learned in medicine" is relatively minor.
Vermont, too, has tried a new approach in utilizing a medical
person's advice. The Vermont statute requires, in the traditional
vein, that a claim must be filed "within six months after the date of
injury." 73 However, a 1961 amendment to the act defines the date of
injury and the date of disablement as:
" ... the date upon which any physician consulted by the
employee and who is licensed to practice medicine in Vermont
shall state in writing, upon a form prepared and provided by
the commissioner, that in the opinion of such physician the
employee then has an occupational disease [as defined by the
act] and is disabled thereby." 74
This provision would seem to remove all doubt as to the date
71 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 43 (1962).

72 No cases have been decided by the courts so interpreting this language, but the
import is fairly clear.
73 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 656 {1959).
74 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1004 (Supp. 1961).
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of the injury. Despite an employee's suspicions, or even his knowledge about his condition, the statute will not run until the required
form is filled out by a physician. Presumably, although the statute
does not say so, the physician will have to give the form to the employee in order to start the statute since the employee is required
to file notice.75 Such a statutory scheme has the attractive feature
of eliminating a judicial decision as to the employee's capacity to
work or as to the reasonableness of the determination that he may
be diseased. There is a possible objection that an employer may be
prejudiced by the fact that an employee may bring the action at
any time he pleases since he is presumably free to visit a physician
or not, as he sees fit. This argument is countered by the fact that
Vermont also has a requirement that disablement, as above defined,
result "within two years after the last injurious exposure." 76 Such
cutoff provisions will be examined in detail below, but it can be
noted in passing that many radiation-induced diseases will not
become manifest within two years. The new provision requiring
a medical diagnosis within two years will eliminate coverage of
many latent conditions and it will put the employee and his physician in a difficult position when the diagnosis is uncertain.
d. Statute Runs From the Employee's Knowledge of His
Condition and Its Connection With His Employment

Fourteen states presently provide that the statute will not run
in cases of occupational diseases caused by exposure to radiation
until the employee is, or reasonably should be, aware of his condition and its causal relation to his employment. 77 Six of these provisions are special statutory exceptions applicable generally to "latent" diseases or specifically to radiation-induced diseases. 78 Five of
the states also provide that the disease must emerge within a certain
defined time period.79
The California statute is of the general type applicable to dis75

Ibid.

tit. 21, § 1006 (1959).
This total includes states utilizing terminology broader than, but including, "occupa•
tional disease." The states and their provisions are: Alaska (disability), California (occupational disease), Delaware (occupational disease), Hawaii (injury or disease), Idaho (occupa•
tional disease), Iowa (occupational disease), Kentucky (occupational disease), Maine
(occupational disease), Missouri (occupational disease), Montana (occupational disease),
New Jersey (occupational disease), New York (pathological changes or malignancies),
Rhode Island (injury including disease), Wisconsin (injury).
78 Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, New York, and Rhode Island.
79 Delaware, Iowa, Montana, New Jersey, and Wisconsin.
76 VT. STAT• .ANN.

77
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eases in general. It provides that a claim must be filed within one
year of the "date of injury" 80 and that:
"The date of injury in cases of occupational diseases is that
date upon which the employee first suffered dis.ability therefrom and either knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that said disability was caused by
his present or prior employment." 81
The benefit of such a statute to the employee is obvious. It
requires first that he be actually disabled and, second, that he
reasonably know that his employment caused the condition. There
is no possibility that the statute may run while the disease remains
latent.
A problem which has received little consideration, but which
well may become important with latent injuries and diseases, is
whether or not the employee must be aware of the fact that a particular employment or just employment in general caused his condition before the statute starts to run. The California statute does
not make it clear that between "present and prior employment"
the employee must know which employment caused the condition.
Faced with an equally ambiguous statute, the New Jersey Superior Court, in a well-reasoned opinion, answered the question
in this manner:
"[T]he statutory references to the employee's knowledge
'of the nature of his disability and its relationship to his employment' are to be taken in the first instance as meaning the
relation of the disability to his employment with the employer
sought to be held accountable in the particular proceeding
rather than to his habitual occupation, per se . ... [S]ince our
concern is with the employee's knowledge that he has a compensable condition, the statute must be interpreted to give
relevance to the employee's knowledge or state of mind concerning every fact which, as a matter of law, whether in statute
or decided case, bears upon the legal responsibility of the
employee to the particular employer being proceeded
against. " 82
Another statute of this general type is that of Wisconsin, which
combines the concept of "accident" and "disease" in one statute, 83
reading:
80 CAL, LAB. CODE ANN. § 5405(a) (1953).
81 CAL, LAB. CODE ANN, § 5412 (1953),

82 Bucuk v. Edward A. Zusi Brass Foundry, 49 N.J. Super. 187, 200, 139 A.2d 436, 443
(1958).
83 WIS. STAT,

ANN, §

102.01(2) (1957).
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"No claim for compensation shall be maintained unless,
within 30 days after the occurrence of the injury or within
30 days after the employee knew or ought to have known the
nature of his disability and its relation to his employment,
actual notice-was received by the employer ... regardless of
whether notice was received, if ... no application is filed with
the commission within 2 years from the date of the injury or
death, or from the date the employee or his dependent knew
or ought to have known the nature of his disability and its
relation to the employment, the right to compensation therefor shall be barred, except ... if the employer knew or should
have known, within the 2 year period, that the employee had
sustained the injury upon which the claim is based." 84
Under this statute an employee is not required to file a claim
if he has only a "suspicion" of disease,85 but knowledge of "facts
indicating its likelihood" is sufficient to start the statute.86 Wisconsin also has a provision stating that the right to compensation "shall
not extend beyond 6 years from the date of injury or death." 87 In
I 961, this provision was altered to provide that " . . . in case of
injury or death caused by exposure to ionized radiation, the right
to proceed hereunder shall not extend beyond 25 years from the
date of injury." 88
The effect of this addition is not entirely clear. In an early case
of latent injury by accident, the Wisconsin court held that "injury"
was the manifestation of a compensable disability. 80 If this holding
is followed in the case of a radiation injury or disease, an employee
would be able to wait twenty-five years from the date of suffering
a compensable disability, which itself might be twenty-five years
after the last exposure. This would be more than adequate for all
cases and now should be modified if so interpreted. The amendment will have its chief effect in cutting off claims filed more than
twenty-five years from the date of termination of employment, since
"injury" is also so defined under the statute.00
The Council of State Governments has suggested a provision
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.12 (1957).
Trustees, Middle River Sanitarium v. Industrial Comm'n, 224 Wis. 536, 272 N.W.
483 (1937).
86 Reinhold v. Industrial Comm'n, 253 Wis. 606, 34 N.W.2d 814 (1948).
87 WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 102.17(4) (1957).
88 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.17(4) (Supp. 1962).
so Acme Body Works v. Industrial Comm'n, 204 Wis. 493, 234 N.W. 756 (1931).
oo Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.01(2) (1957); see Weissgerber v. Industrial Comm'n, 242 Wis.
181, 7 N.W .2d 415 (1943).
84
85

1963]

RADIATION INJURIES

277

applicable to all "latent" conditions. This provision has been
enacted in Rhode Island and reads:
"The time for filing claims shall not begin to run in cases
of latent or undiscovered physical or mental impairment due
to injury including disease until (1) the person claiming
benefits knew, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should
have known, of the existence of such impairment and its
(causal) relationship to his employment or (2) after disablement, whichever is later, provided, that in any case in which
indemnity benefits have been paid, the claimant's right to compensation is preserved without time limitation." 91
This provision has the advantage of encompassing all radiationinduced conditions as well as other conditions of a latent character.
It is notable that a claim need not be filed until the employee knows
or should know, both of the existence of the condition and of its
relation to employment. If the employee is ill and knows the cause
of his illness, but has not yet suffered a compensable disability, the
statute will not run until that disability is incurred.
Eleven states have recently amended their laws to provide
specifically for radiation-induced conditions.92 The Idaho statute
provides:
"Unless written notice of the manifestation of an occupational disease shall be given by the workman to the employer
within sixty days after the first manifestation thereof, ... and,
unless claim for disability or death be given within one year
after the disability, or death, respectively, all rights to compensation for disability or death, from an occupational disease
shall be forever barred, provided that when disability or death
is the result of an exposure to radioactive properties or [sic]
substances or the source of the ionizing radiation in any occupation involving contact therewith, handling thereof or exposure thereto, written notice may be given any time and
claim filed within one year after the date upon which the
employee first suffered incapacity, disability or death from
such exposure and knew or in the exercise of reasonable diliR.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 28-35-57 (Supp. 1962).
HAWAII REv. LAws § 97-52 (Supp. 1961); IDAHO CoDE ANN. § 72-1228 (Supp. 1961);
IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-2205(e) (Supp. 1963); IowA CODE ANN. § 85A.12 (Supp. 1962); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 44-5al7 (Supp. 1961); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 31, § 70-A (Supp. 1961); N.Y.
WoRKMEN's CoMr. LAws § 28; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 43 (Supp. 1962); R.I. GEN. LAws
ANN. §§ 28-34-4, 28-35-57 (Supp. 1962); S.C. CODE § 72-256, as amended, Act 250, Laws of
1963 (reported in CCH ATOM. ENERGY L. REP. 1f 17449); VA. CODE ANN. § 65-49 (Supp.
1962).
01
02
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gence should have known that the occupational disease was
caused by his present or prior employment." 93
Eight statutes covering radiation diseases follow this pattern94
and would seem to cover adequately most diseases caused by exposure to radiation, although some question might be raised as to
the justification for giving special treatment to radiation-induced
conditions. Of course, if "manifestation" and "disability" are read
to require reasonable knowledge of the condition and its connection with employment, such a statutory provision is not really necessary except to the degree that a statutory rule is more certain than
a judicial one. It might also be noted that these statutes follow the
general trend of requiring only "reasonable" knowledge on the
part of the employee, although one statute of the general character95
and two applicable to both latent and radiation diseases96 seem to
require that the employee have actual knowledge.
Of the recent amendments pertaining exclusively to radiation
diseases, that of Indiana departs from the general scheme. Rather
than having the period run strictly from the date of the employee's
reasonable knowledge of his condition, the statute provides that:
"[I]n all cases of occupational disease caused by exposure to
radiation, no compensation shall be payable unless disablement, as herein defined, occurs within two (2) years from the
date on which the employee had knowledge of the nature of
his occupational disease or by the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known of the existence of such disease and
its causal relationship to his employment." 97
This approach seems to be entirely novel. The statute will not
operate at all until the employee has, or should have, knowledge of
his condition and its relationship to his employment. Then, it
requires that disability, as defined, emerge or result within two
years of that knowledge. The Indiana legislature apparently has
decided to balance the employee's interest in recovery against the
employer's difficulty of proof after a two-year period of time from
sickness to disability. However, it must be noted again that in cases
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-1228 (Supp. 1963).
Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, New York, Oklahoma, and Rhode Island. The
Kansas and Iowa statutes also provide a cutoff date. See Part Il(D) infra. The Virginia stat•
ute removes any requirement of filing a claim.
95 .ALASKA COMP. LAws ANN. § 43-3-51 (Supp. 1959).
96 HAWAII REv. LAws § 97.52 (Supp. 1961); N.Y. WoRKMEN's CoMP. LAw § 28.
97 IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-2205(e) (Supp. 1963). Compare with the provisions for accidental
injury set out in text accompanying note 28 supra.
93

94
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of latent radiation diseases, actual disability may not develop until
long after the employee actually acquires knowledge that he suffers
from a work-connected radiation-induced condition. A case of
chronic leukemia could raise this problem.

B. Over-all Cutoff Provisions-Statutes Requiring the Emergence
of the Condition Within a Certain Period of Time,
Regardless of Filing
Twenty-four states have provisions which set up an arbitrary
period within which a claim for an occupational disease such as
could arise from exposure to radiation must be filed, or within
which the compensable condition must occur. These periods generally are dated either from the termination of employment in
which the exposure occurred or from the last exposure itself. In
effect, under this statutory scheme the disease must emerge within
the given period of time and, except in one state which has only
this provision,98 the employee also must file his claim within a
period which will be one of those examined above. Therefore, in
spite of proper filing, no claim for compensation can ever be entertained if the disease does not emerge (as defined by statute) within
the given period.
The Delaware statute provides:
"All claims for compensation for compensable occupational disease shall be forever barred unless a petition is filed
... within one year after ... the employee first acquired such
knowledge that the disability was or could have been caused
by or had resulted from his employment, provided, however,
that all claims must be filed within .5 years after the date on
which the employee ceased to be exposed in the course of employment with the employer to such occupational disease." 99
If the condition does not develop within that five-year period, the
employee has no cause of action. An objection may be voiced to this
type of provision similar to that which was raised against a strict
interpretation of "accident" provisions; this requirement may bar
claims before they accrue. In view of the amount of time it may
take a radiation-induced condition to develop, such cutoff provisions may be manifestly unfair. However, the cutoff provisions are
somewhat different from those for filing claims. They represent a
legislative judgment that after a certain length of time, all claims
98 West Virginia.
90 DEL, CODE ANN,

tit. 19, § 236l(c) (Supp. 1961).
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will be irrebuttably presumed not to be associated with employment. It is an attempt to provide the employer with some certainty
that an employee will not be able to pursue a claim against him for
an indefinite period. Such attempts at certainty express a valid
purpose. Even accepting the validity of this purpose, a number of
statutes presently provide unreasonably short cutoff periods. Therefore, it is not surprising that a number of states with such provisions
have altered them insofar as radiation-induced conditions are concerned.
Colorado, Texas, and Virginia have eliminated cutoff provisions completely for radiation diseases. The Colorado statute now
runs from the date of "disability." 100 The Virginia statute, with
questionable wisdom, removes all requirements heretofore applicable to the filing of claims.101 The Texas statute, although it apparently attempted to impose some sort of period, seems entirely
inadequate to do so. 102 Among states using the date of the last exposure, Iowa has extended her period from one to two years, 103
Illinois from one to five years,104 Oregon from three to seven
years, 105 and Ohio from two to eight years. 106 Of states using the date
of termination of employment in which exposure was suffered,
Kansas has extended the period from one to three years, 101 and
Wisconsin from six to twenty-five years. 108
The recently enacted Nevada statute raises some new problems.
That statute provides:
"An occupational disease defined in this chapter shall be
deemed to arise out of and in the course of employment ...
only when the disease was contracted within 12 months pre100 Cow. REv. STAT. ANN. § 81-18-11 (Supp. 1961).
101 VA. CODE ANN. § 65-49 (Supp. 1962).
102 TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 25 (1962

Supp.). It must be acknowledged
that a court may come up with a different construction. The judgment given, however,
seems inescapable from the language of the statute. On first reading, the statute seems to
be stating a requirement that either "death or incapacity result within ••• one (1) year"
of the following prescribed date. The date given, however, is that upon which "the
employee first suffered incapacity therefrom and either knew, or in the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have known, that said disease was caused by his present or
prior employment." The legislature obviously intended to introduce a reasonable knowledge requirement-but its attempt left a provision which, if strictly read, is impossible to
apply.
103 IowA CoDE ANN. § 85A.12 (Supp. 1962).
104 ILL. ANN. STAT. § 172.36(f) (Supp. 1962).
105 ORE. REv. STAT. § 656.807 (1961).
106 OHIO REv. CODE § 4123.68 (Anderson Supp. 1962).
101 KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 44-5al7 (Supp. 1959). But it seems that disablement is
still required one year from the last exposure. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 44-5a01 (Supp. 1961).
10s Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.17(4) (Supp. 1962).
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vious to the date of disablement, except in cases of disability
resulting from radium poisoning or exposure to radioactive
properties or [sic] substances, or to roentgen rays (X-rays) or
ionizing radiation, in which cases the poisoning or illness
resulting in disability must have been contracted in the state
of Nevada within 4 years prior to the date on which such disability occurred, while the claimant was covered by the provisions of this chapter and not while the claimant was an employee of the ... United States or any of its contractors or
subcontractors. '' 109
The statute uses traditional concepts of disability and cutoff.
However, the concept of the date upon which a disease was "contracted" is one which Nevada, Louisiana,11° and Minnesota111 alone
use and only in Minnesota apparently has it received judicial consideration. The supreme court of that state has declared that the
date of "contraction" is the date upon which there is the first
manifestation of the disease which disables bodily functions to the
extent that the employee can no longer substantially perform his
work.112 This approach obviously reads a great deal into the statute
in order to achieve some clarity. Yet, the court's interpretation is
unsatisfactory, as it leaves the vital question of employee knowledge unanswered.113
Whether or not the Nevada court will adopt the Minnesota
court's approach to the localization of the date of "contraction"
remains to be seen. The statutory phrase itself seems inept since
localization is a prerequisite. It is often difficult, if not impossible,
to localize the time at which a disease was "contracted," particularly
so in the case of a disease such as some of those induced by radiation.
100 NEV. REv. STAT. § 617.440 (1961).
110 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1031.l(D)

(Supp. 1962) reads: "All claims for disablement
arising from an occupational disease are forever barred unless the employee files a claim ...
within four months of the date of his contraction of the disease or within four months
of the date that the disease first manifested itself."
111 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.66 (Supp. 1962). See also S.C. CODE § 72-256 (1952), which
employs similar language but is essentially different from the above provisions in that it
requires "contraction" within one year after exposure. Thus, the date of "contraction"
would seem to refer to the date upon which the disease emerged or, in the generally used
language, became "manifest," rather than when it was acquired.
112 Anderson v. City of Minneapolis, 258 Minn. 221, 103 N.W.2d 397 (1960); Kellerman
v. City of St. Paul, 211 Minn. 351, I N.W.2d 378 (1941).
113 The court may have recognized this problem in Anderson v. City of Minneapolis,
supra note 13, at 225, 103 N.W.2d 397 at 400, in which it stated: "The difficulty in applying
this rule arises with respect to the degree of interference with bodily functions necessary
before it can be said that the disease is contracted." It found, on the facts of the case,
that the claim was timely when the employee became unable to perform "substantially
all the functions he had done prior thereto." Needless to say, this leaves the knowledge
question an open one.
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In such cases the total exposure may be received over a long period
of time and, in addition, the condition may not manifest itself until
long after the last exposure. These facts make the date of "contraction" most uncertain.
Even if the date of contraction can be localized, the statute requires that disability result within four years from that date. The
possible insufficiency of this period has been discussed adequately
above. Although essentially a problem of coverage, it should be
noted also that the requirement that contraction occur in Nevada
and while not working for the federal government may create problems for the claimant who may have been exposed to different
sources of radiation in various states. He would face a difficult and
often impossible task if required to prove under which exposure or
exposures he "contracted" the disease.
C. Tolling the Statute
Various statutory provisions are made for tolling or suspending the notice and claim provisions. The notice provisions may be
tolled in a number of states if the employer has actual knowledge
of the injury or is not prejudiced by failure of notice. 114 Claim
requirements may be lifted for a number of statutory reasons, such
as "good cause," payment of compensation by the employer, minority, and incompetency.115 These provisions vary widely and, aside
from those relating to good cause which are discussed above,116
generally do not raise any problems peculiar to radiation cases.
One provision which exists in a few jurisdictions may be of
interest in this area. Some statutes toll the claim provisions in the
absence of a report by an employer who has notice of the employee's
injury. 117 The Michigan provision reads:
"[I]n all cases in which the employer has been given notice
or knowledge of happening of said accident, within 3 months
after the happening of same, and fails, neglects, or refuses to
report said injury to the compensation commission as required
by these provisions of this act, the statute of limitations shall
not run against the claim of an injured employee ... until a
report of said injury shall have been filed with the compensation commission." 118
114
115
116
117
118

See 2 LARsoN § 78.30.
See 2 LARSON § 78.45.
See discussion in text accompanying
See SCHNEIDER § 2370.
MICH. STAT• .ANN. § 17.165 (1960).

notes

33 &: 34

supra.
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Under this provision a question can be raised as to what constitutes "happening of the injury." The Michigan court has provided some guides here. If the employer has actual notice of the
"fact and occurrence" of injury, he must file his report.119 However,
under these provisions, if the injury is of a latent character, the employer is not deemed to have notice until such injury becomes manifest and he is aware of the manifestation. 120 Hence, it would seem
that if an employee were irradiated and the employer knew of the
event, this alone would not prevent the statute from running. The
employer also would have to know that the employee suffered a
compensable disability because of the exposure.
It seems desirable to allow discretion in the courts and commissions to provide relief in cases in which a claimant justifiably does
not or is not able to file notice or claim. In general, however, the
periods of limitations ought to be framed in such fashion as to
avoid the necessity of looking for an excuse for failure to file. The
tolling provisions may be used to avoid the strictures of the statutory period,121 but such avoidance ought not to be necessary.

Ill.

RADIATION-INDUCED CONDITIONS AND THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

A. Categorization
The problem of categorizing a particular condition as an "accidental injury" or as an "occupational disease" is one which arises
in various contexts in the workmen's compensation field. If a condition does not fit either category it will not be compensable in
most states. Once it is categorized, the categorization given may
dictate the result. This situation is easily illustrated by considering
the principles laid out in the sections above as applied to a hypothetical case.
An employee could contract leukemia from prolonged exposure
to radioactive sources but the condition usually would not become
manifest until four to eight years after exposure, which may be
after the employee ceases to work for the employer whose radiation
source exposed the worker. The period could be as high as fifteen
years. The statutory provisions of two states demonstrate the di£-·
ferent determinations which might result because of categorization. In Arizona, if leukemia is treated as a disease, this hypothetical
119 Dewitt v. Grand Rapids Fuel Co., 346 Mich. 209, 77 N.W.2d 759 (1956).
Paridee v. Great A &: P Tea Co., 278 Mich. 191, 270 N.W. 263 (1936).
See cases cited in notes 33 &: 34 supra.
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case would probably be deemed uncompensable because disability
did not occur, as required by the statute, within 120 days of the
last day of employment.122 If, on the other hand, it can be treated
as an accidental injury, the condition would seem compensable
under the statute which provides that a claim is to be filed within
one year of the date of the "injury." 123
If the same situation arose in California, the opposite result
would flow from the same categorizations. If the condition is
deemed an accidental injury, the claim would be barred by the
requirement that it be filed within one year of the date of the
"accident."124 If leukemia is classified as a disease, however, the
employee need not file, until he suffers a "disability" and knows
or reasonably should know of the causal relation to employment.125
The artificiality of these results is apparent. The "accidental
injury"-"occupational disease" dichotomy is itself the product of
historical development, not necessity.126 In general, legislative intent has been to broaden coverage of occupation-induced conditions
by the addition of the occupational disease concept. However, this
addition left some holes in coverage and, moreover, raised the question about which section of the act is applicable in a particular instance. In apparent recognition of this difficulty, some states have
attempted to deal with both accident and disease under the broad
heading of "injury." 127 Generically, "injury" certainly is broad
enough to include all forms of bodily hurt. 128 Nonetheless, "injury"
is widely associated with the term "accidental" and some courts
have not been able to resist reading this into the statute,128 even
after a legislature has carefully excised it. 130
ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-1107(2) (1956).
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-106l(D) (1956). See English v. Industrial Comm'n, 73
Ariz. 86, 237 P.2d 815 (1951); Hartford Acc. 8: lndem. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 43 Ariz.
50, 29 P.2d 142 (1934), discussed in text accompanying note 13 supra.
124 CAL. LAB. CoDE ANN.§ 5411 (1953). See Johnson v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 157 Cal.
App. 2d 838, 321 P .2d 856 (1958) (statute runs despite employee's reasonable ignorance of
his condition).
125 CAL. LAB. CODE ANN. § 5412 (1953).
126 See l LARsoN § 40.60.
127 E.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 102.01(2), 102.12 (1957) discussed in text accompanying notes
83 8: 84 supra.
128 "[I]njury . . . is the general term for hurt of any sort, whether suffered by a
person •.. or a thing." WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1957).
129 Middleton v. Texas Power 8: Light Co., 108 Tex. 96, 185 S.W. 556 (1916). The
holding of this case is qualified in Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Mincey, 255 S.W.2d 262
(Tex. Civ. App. 1953). Martin v. State Compensation Comm'r, 107 W. Va. 583, 149 S.E.
824 (1929); In re Scrogham, 52 Wyo. 232, 73 P.2d 300 (1937). The statutes of these states
make reference to "accidental injury." The statute of Ohio makes no such references;
nevertheless, "accident" was read into the coverage provisions. Malone v. Industrial
Comm'n, 140 Ohio St. 292, 43 N.E.2d 266 (1942).
1so The Michigan legislature reduced the number of references to "accident" from
122
12s
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The goal to be achieved is a statute which covers all disabling
and compensable conditions resulting from employment conditions, whether associated with accident, disease, or otherwise. Because of the limitations of language, it is improbable that usage
of terms associated with old concepts can be escaped entirely.
Nevertheless, it does seem possible and desirable to define such
terms so that no court can escape their meaning. 131
B. Time Limitations
I. Claim Filing
The claim filing provisions embody two different requirements:
(1) the date from which the period runs and (2) the length of the
period. The length of the period chosen is obviously the secondary
consideration because a fair length depends largely upon the starting date. It is clear from the above review that, despite a widely
varying statutory pattern, most courts, whenever possible, have
interpreted statutory provisions as requiring reasonable knowledge
on the part of employees. In most instances in which this has not
been done, the reason has been that the legislature provided carefully drafted language which made such a reading virtually impossible. It is to be noted that the only statutory language which has
not been subject to this interpretation has been that which substitutes, in some manner, a medical person's actions for those of
the employee. 132 There is authority to read all other types of statutory provisions as requiring that the employee have reasonable
knowledge.
In any event, the reasonable knowledge provision seems the
fairest one to utilize. The statute is designed to provide a period in
which the employee must file his claim and he should not be
required to file such a claim when he does not or cannot reasonably
know of his right to compensation. Such a requirement is patently
unreasonable. There may well be reasons for providing some final
date beyond which no claims may be filed, 133 but such a provision
should be independent of that limiting the filing of claims. It might
be possible to incorporate other standards as alternatives, but the
fifty-four to five. The court held nevertheless that "injury" meant "accidental injury."
Arnold v. Ogle Constr. Co., 333 Mich. 652, 53 N.W.2d 655 (1952). The holding of this case
has been questioned in later opinions. See, e.g., Coombe v. Penegor, 348 Mich. 635, 656,
83 N.W.2d 603, 610 (1957).
131 E.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.01(2) (1957). "[I]njury is mental or physical harm to
an employee caused by accident or disease .•.."
132 See Part II(C) supra.
133 See discussion in text accompanying notes 137-45 infra.
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requirement that the statute run only when the employee knows,
or should know, of his condition and its relation to employment
seems fairest over-all. This means that the statute ought not to run
until the employee is aware (1) that he suffers from a compensable
condition and (2) that the compensable condition is related to a
particular employment.
In considering radiation-induced conditions, a different date for
filing claims may also be advanced, i.e., the date of actual notice
of exposure to a potentially disabling source. If such a provision
were adopted, however, one situation would not need to be included. Under some coverage provisions in workmen's compensation statutes, exposure alone may give rise to a compensable condition. For example, exposure to a certain dosage of radiation may
entitle the employee to receive retraining for an occupation which
does not involve risk of further exposure. 134 It would not be necessary that any physical manifestation result from the exposure.
Therefore, a provision requiring filing of a claim upon actual
notice of exposure would not be necessary for this type of condition.
If an exposure is sufficient to create a right to retraining, a compensable condition exists and actual notice of exposure would be
equivalent to reasonably prudent knowledge of a compensable condition. For delayed effects of known exposures, however, it would
be possible to require an immediate filing of notice of exposure
even though it will not be possible to determine for perhaps many
years whether or not a compensable condition actually will arise.
Such a filing upon the date of actual notice of exposure rather
than the date of manifestation of the compensable condition would
make it possible to establish a record of exposures and potential
claimants as well as facilitate proof of exposure amounts. Both these
purposes might seem to provide sufficient reason for requiring such
advance claim filing. However, effectiveness of such a provision in
large part would depend upon other provisions of the statute which
must be considered at this point.
To assure an accurate record of potential claims, the employee
must have some effective incentive, either positive or negative, to
file his claim. On the negative side, the statute could be framed to
bar all claims for injuries developing from any exposure of which
the employee had notice. For example:
"A claim for compensation must be filed within one year
of the date upon which the employee knew, or in the exercise
134 See ATOMS AND THE LAw 829-30.
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of reasonable diligence should have known, of the existence of
a compensable condition and its relation to employment. Provided: if the employee has actual notice of exposure to a potentially disabling source, he must file a claim within one year of
that actual notice for all injuries which may arise from this
exposure."
This certainly would provide an excellent negative incentive to file
claims on actual notice of exposure. If there is good reason for such
advance filing, it is better to make it mandatory rather than permissive, but the latter type of incentive could be provided by changing the proviso to read: "a claim may be filed upon actual notice of
exposure to a potentially disabling source." In either case, the
basic question is whether or not the difficulties raised by advance
filing provisions are outweighed by the advantages achieved.
Problems of proof undoubtedly will arise. The employee may
have received exposures of which he was not aware, in addition to
that of which he had notice. Often it will be difficult, if not impossible, to prove which exposure or exposures caused the condition. In addition, the spectre of numerous frivolous and unjustified
claims by employees arises. Unless some exposure level line is drawn,
the well-advised employee will file an advance claim whenever he
has the slightest reason to suspect an exposure has occurred. By
barring any claim arising from a known exposure unless notice is
filed, the statutory provisions here suggested are in the nature of
a penalty. Even if the positive inducement provision were used,
there would still be every reason to file a claim for every exposure,
no matter how small, because some inducement such as keeping
open all claims once filed undoubtedly would be used. In addition,
this type of provision keeps the period open indefinitely, a highly
questionable policy. Although this point will be discussed in more
detail below in relation to the cutoff period,185 it should be pointed
out here that keeping the period so open largely removes the definiteness sought to be attained by imposing the cutoff period in the
first place.
In spite of these difficulties, however, a very good reason for
advance filing relating to proof problems does exist. There probably is little reason for immediate notice of exposure from the
standpoint of medical treatment. Nevertheless, in proving whether
or not exposure occurred and, if so, in what amounts, it may be very
important to know immediately of any alleged accident so that it
185

See discussion in text accompanying notes 136-44 infra.
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can be reconstructed and the dosimetry determined as accurately
as possible.136 A related advantage of immediate notice of exposure
is that some latent diseases which can arise from exposure will not
do so short of a minimum latency period. 137 If we are to use existing
rules of proving causal connection between the irradiation and the
disease in question, advantage should be taken of existing scientific
knowledge. An employer should not be charged for diseases which
scientists know cannot have resulted from the exposure in question.
For these reasons it is essential that advance filing of notice of known
exposures be required.
A solution does exist for one of the most serious disadvantages
of advance filing, i.e., that every minute exposure will be filed and
this will become an administrative nuisance. On the basis of present
scientific knowledge, and so long as the existing proof of causation
rules are used, a very good case can be made for limiting recovery
for occupation exposures to those in which the acute dose is larger
than 35 r, because below that level the increased chance of having
the disease is so small as to be de minimis. 138 Even the total chance
136 This is particularly true in the case of criticality excursions where a mock-up of
the "incident" might be required or where blood sodium-24 determinations are useful
in calculating neutron exposure. See Union Carbide Nuclear Company Report Y-1234,
Accidental Radiation Excursion at the Y-12 plant, Final Report 5-23 (1958). See also
Hurst & Ritchie, Radiation Accidents: Dosimetric Aspects of Neutron and Gamma-Ray
Exposures, Part A 1-16, 19-22 (Oak Ridge Nat'l Lab. 2748) (1959).
137 This will allow exclusion of certain cases in which the onset of the disease is
before the minimum latent period. For the leukemias the latent period is from two to
fifteen years with the peak incidence occurring between the fourth and seventh years.
There is no documented evidence of an increased number of cases of leukemia in the first
fifteen months after exposure in any of the series of studies of exposed individuals. See
National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council, Effects of Ionizing Radiation on
the Human Hemapactic System 5-7 (Publication 875) (1961). See also U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF.
REc., 17th Sess., Supp. No. 16, 145-47 (A/5216) (1962).
138 If it is assumed (1) that radiation has a linear dose-effect relationship with regard
to leukemogenesis down to zero dose, (2) that the average natural incidence of leukemia
is about 7 per 100,000 population at risk per year, and (3) that there is a probability of
radiation-induced leukemia of bone marrow origin of two cases per rad per 1,000,000
population at risk per year, 35 rads will give the exposed individual a probability of
developing leukemia from a given exposure nearly equal to his probability of developing
it from natural causes (35 X 2 or 70 out of one million or 7 out of one hundred thousand).
This assumes that radiation induces all varieties of leukemia, that radiation leukemogenesis
is not sex, age, or dose-rate dependent and that the radiation has a lifetime rather than
a limited (two to fifteen years) leukemogenic effect. It further assumes that the natural
incidence of all leukemias does not vary with age or sex and that the probability of
radiation-induced leukemia is not reduced because of deaths from other causes than
leukemia. All of these are conservative assumptions in favor of the potential victim. See
Lewis, Leukemia and Ionizing Radiation, 125 SCIENCE 965-72 (1957). For an opposing
view, see Brues, Critique of the Linear Theory of Carcinogenesis, 128 SCIENCE 693-99
(1958). See general discussion of scientific facts and their application to the contingent
injury fund idea in Estep, Radiation Injuries and Statistics: The Need for a New Approach
to Injury Litigation, 59 Mrca. L. REv. 259 (1960).
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of contracting the disease, including natural incidence possibilities,
is very small in such cases. If this floor is accepted most of the
administrative nuisance difficulty inherent in an advance filing
requirement is obviated.
If, as suggested earlier by one of the present writers, 139 a contingent injury fund alternative were accepted as a solution to the
proof of causal connection problem, then advance filing would be ·
required in every case and an immediate determination would be
made of the amount of exposure and the increased chances of the
disease caused by the particular source of radiation. The recommendations made here, however, are for changes which should be
made in existing rules in which causation must be proved by the
claimant to have "more probably than not" been connected with
defendant's source.
Whether or not advance filing as outlined above is required,
so long as the filing period is based upon the employee's knowledge
of exposure and work connection, as it should be, provision must be
made for terminating the employee's filing right at some period
after the notice. In any event, there is no need for a long period because by hypothesis the employee has knowledge of the vital facts.
Many statutes allow one year, which certainly is long enough if
our recommendations are accepted. A strong case could be made,
however, for making it considerably shorter, such as six or even
three months. The shorter period would better meet the needs for
proof of the fact and level of exposure, as suggested above.

2. Over-All Cutoff Dates
A claim-filing requirement which is based on the employee's
reasonable knowledge of his physical condition would of itself allow the employee to file at any time the condition developed. This
would be so regardless of the length of time which may have elapsed
from the exposure to the manifestation of the condition or from the
termination of employment with the employer in whose service the
injurious exposure occurred. Such a provision potentially extends
the employer's liability to the life of the employee, assuming, of
course, that compensation of some sort140 is still available under the
statute. Problems of proof are obvious difficulties in such a situation
and the employer may thus be forced to keep extensive records on
present and past employees. Considerations of this nature have
130
140

Ibid.
For example, medical and hospital expenses.

290

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

prompted many states to enact the provisions, reviewed above,141
which terminate the right to make a claim after a certain period
regardless of what may be the terms of the claim-filing provisions.
Other legislatures have enacted no such legislation, presumably
reasoning that if the condition is related to employment and can be
so proved, it ought to be compensable, since it is no fault of the
- employee that the condition is delayed. 142
There is merit in both views. Cutoff dates provide, in effect,
an irrebuttable presumption that the condition is not causally
related to employment. The employer is thus given some guarantee
that beyond a set date a particular employee cannot pursue any
claim. The difficulty is, of course, that we know that a given condition may indeed be related to employment in spite of the legislative
presumption that it is not. In short, the cutoff period provides a
balancing of interests and, as such, is not satisfactory in every instance. It is the view of the present writers that if such a period is
provided, it should be carefully shaped to deal fairly with the difficulties inherent in the nature of radiation-induced conditions.
These difficulties will now be examined.
The Date From Which the Period Runs. The traditional cutoff periods have required that either the condition emerge or that
a claim be filed within a certain time from either the date of last exposure in employment or from the last day of the employment in
which the injurious exposure was suffered. 148 There have been few
deviations from this pattern-none of which bears review at this
point.144 Of the generally used dates, that of the last day of employment provides the most certainty. However, exposure to an actually
or potentially injurious source may well cease long before employment with that employer ends. Undoubtedly this is the reason
that the majority of states have chosen the date of the last injurious
exposure. 145 Although the facts of any given case may vary, generally this date will be much more uncertain than the date of last
employment. In cases of exposure to radiation, the uncertainty
will probably be even greater. For that reason it is recommended
that the statute utilize the last day of possible exposure to a potentially injurious source. Use of this date would avoid holding the
See discussion in text accompanying notes 97-113 supra.
This is the view apparently advanced in 2 Larson §§ 78.42(b)·42(c) and to a lesser
degree in SCHNEIDER § 2358. However, neither commentator distinguishes clearly between
the claim filing requirements and the cutoff type of provision.
143 See discussion in text accompanying notes 97-113 supra and Appendix A.
144 These are discussed in the text accompanying notes 110-14 supra.
145 See Appendix A.
141
142
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period open from the possibly long removed termination of employment. At the same time, it would give the employee the benefit
of keeping the period open from the last possibility of injurious exposure. It should be noted that such a provision would have no
effect on the employee's burden of proving causation. The proof
section of the statute would exist separately from this section and
its requirements would have to met separately. The only effect of
the suggested provision would be to allow the cutoff provision to
run from the date of exposure most favorable to the employee regardless of which exposure or exposures may be proved to have
caused the condition. At the same time it would not postpone starting the period until a time often unrelated to the potential injury,
i.e., the last date of employment.
Effect of the Period. The general effect of the cutoff period is,
of course, to bar all claims which develop after a certain date. However, three variations within this general pattern may be provided.
First, the period may be used to bar only those claims, including
potential claims, which have not been filed. This effect presumes
the utilization of some system of recording potential claims, the
desirability of which was discussed above. 146 Even if such a system is
employed, it is suggested that the cutoff provisions should work
against potential claims also, requiring not only that a filing of the
claim but also that the condition itself develop within the given
period. To provide otherwise would be to sacrifice a great deal of
the certainty sought to be achieved by the cutoff. Thus, the second
alternative would be to require that the condition emerge within
the given period and that compensation be available only for that
period. An employee could receive compensation only for that
portion of his condition which occurred before the cutoff date. A
third alternative would be to block compensation for conditions
emerging after the cutoff date, but to allow full compensation for
conditions emerging before the date even though they continued
beyond it. Of the last two possibilities, the third is that which has
received greatest support in the statutes and case law. 147 It is suggested, therefore, that this approach be incorporated in the radiation sections of the workmen's compensation acts.
Length of the Period. Existing statutes employ cutoff periods
See discussion in text accompanying notes 133-35 supra.
Unfortunately, the subject has not been explored by the commentators and writers.
However, most statutes are framed on the lines of the New Jersey statute which is discussed in the text accompanying note 99 supra. Such provisions explicitly require only
that a claim be filed.
HO
147
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which vary from 120 days to twenty-five years. 148 In view of the fact
that manifestation of many radiation-induced conditions may be
long delayed, a fairly long period, from twenty-five to thirty years,
should be provided. Such a period would allow coverage of most
radiation-induced conditions, while at the same time providing
the desired cutoff.
C. Employer Knowledge of Exposure and the Statute of

Limitations
Among the essentially novel problems raised by radiation exposure is that of the employer's knowledge of exposure suffered
by the employee. The traditionally conceived compensable conditions are accidental injuries and occupational diseases of which,
by their very nature, the employee is likely to have first notice. Of
course, numerous radiation-induced conditions will fit this pattern.
If they do, there is no reason to treat them as different from "ordinary" accidental injuries or occupational diseases. However, in
numerous circumstances exposure to an actually or potentially
disabling source of radiation may occur and the employee would
not necessarily have knowledge of this exposure. The employer, on
the other hand, will probably know of the exposure, at least if he
follows good radiation safety procedures. The obvious problem is
whether or not to require that the employer report this exposure.
Although this question is not directly related to the statute of limitations provisions, the effect of the employer's failure to report,
should such a duty be imposed, may be so related. Therefore, the
problem merits full consideration here.
Basis for the Requirement. If the employer is required to report even nondisabling exposures, there is a strong possibility of
inducing unreasoned fear in the employee, with a resulting filing
of frivolous claims, or possibly actual disablement caused solely by
psychological reactions. Nonetheless, it is suggested that a report of
exposure to radiation above certain prescribed minimum safety
levels should be required. In the first place, the exposure may be of
such an extent as immediately to entitle the employee to compensation.149 An employer who knows of the exposure knows that the
employee is entitled to compensation. In fairness, he should be required to communicate this information to the employee. Similarly,
if an employee is allowed or required to file a claim for potential
148

149

See Appendix A.
For example, retraining expenses. See

ATOMS AND THE

LAw 829-30.
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injuries,1110 employer knowledge of the exposure is knowledge that
the employee could file a claim. This information, too, ought to be
given to the employee. The serious difficulty arises when an employee suffers relatively slight overexposures which do not give
rise to an immediately compensable condition or do not allow the
employee to file a claim immediately. Such exposure to potentially disabling radiation places the employee in a dangerous position. If he is unaware of the exposure suffered, he may unwittingly
subject himself to further exposure in subsequent employment or
during medical treatment, which would be extremely hazardous in
view of the prior exposure. Hence, when exposure exceeds certain
levels, the employer should be required to report it.
Relation to the Statute of Limitations. To be fully effective,
a provision requiring reporting of exposure must be implemented
by enforcement provisions. Two possibilities may be utilized. An
obvious one would be to provide a monetary fine. An alternative,
however, would be a provision which in some manner suspended
the statute of limitations. The use of such a scheme should depend
upon the type of limitation provisions in effect. If the reasonable
knowledge standard is employed, there is no reason to suspend this
section unless it is determined that the employer should be penalized for his failure to report. The reason for this conclusion is
apparent. The reasonable knowledge system requires that the employee file only when he has, or should have, knowledge. The employer's failure to communicate this knowledge to the employee,
although it may prejudice him insofar as subsequent exposures are
concerned,151 will not prejudice him insofar as the claim-filing requirements are concerned. The cutoff section of the statute, however, presents a different problem. If the exposure suffered gives
rise to a compensable condition or if potential claims are allowed
and they are not affected by the cutoff period provision, then the
employer's failure to give notice clearly prejudices the employee
whose right to compensation will be terminated if no claim is filed
within the period. Clearly the employer ought not to be allowed to
so benefit from his willful or negligent failure to fulfill his legal
duty; hence, under these circumstances, the cutoff period ought to
be suspended. Of course, if potential claims are allowed but the
cutoff operates on them, there is no need to suspend the statute of
See discussion in text accompanying notes 133-35 supra.
If the employee does in fact suffer because of the employer's negligent or willful
failure to give notice, a separate provision for a monetary fine or perhaps even allowing
an action at law might well be in order.
150
151
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limitations since a filing for a condition which developed after the
period would be irrelevant.
The above suggestions would put the employee in the position
he would have been in had the employer fulfilled his legal duty.
The employee gains nothing other than the presumption that he
would have filed a claim had he been given the relevant information. Any further suspension of the statutory period would be, in
effect, a penalty to the employer and an unjustified windfall to the
employee. Although a monetary fine might be appropriate for an
employer who disregards the statute, there seems no reason to
benefit the employee unnecessarily in these cases.
Relevant Existing Statutory Provisions. Two types of existing
statutory provisions are relevant to this problem. First are the long
existent provisions requiring, generally, that the employer report to
the workmen's compensation agency all accidental injuries and
sometimes occupational diseases of which he has actual knowledge
or is given notice by the employee.152 The purpose of these provisions seems to be to assure that the employer is following through
on the employee's right to compensation. It is to be emphasized
that these provisions require that the employer actually know that
the employee has, or claims to have, suffered a disabling or compensable condition. The employer's knowledge that an event has
occurred which could give rise to such a condition is not sufficient
to necessitate a report to the agency. 153
These provisions are relevant here because five states provide
that the statute of limitations will, in some manner, be suspended
until the employer files his report. 154 In most cases such a provision
is an outright gift to the employee, for he too has knowledge of his
condition. The fact that the employer has or has not filed his report
will not affect that knowledge in any way. Hence, suspension of the
statute of limitations in these circumstances seems to be a questionable remedy. Most states provide only a nominal monetary fine, 155
while a few couple this with an alternative jail sentence.156
The applicability of these provisions to radiation problems is
somewhat unclear. Of course, if the radiation-induced condition is
similar to an "ordinary" injury, the provisions will operate in the
See Appendix B.
The statutory language makes this point clear; two cases underscore it. See Sanchez
v. Bemadilli County, 57 N.M. 217, 257 P.2d 909 (1953); Paridee v. Great A&: P Tea Co.,
278 Mich. 191, 270 N.W. 263 (1936).
154 See Appendix B.
ms Ibid.
156 Ibid.
152
153
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ordinary manner. However, the question arises whether or not
such statutes could be read to require that the employer report
every slight overexposure of which he has knowledge. First, it is
to be noted that no statute specifically embodies the notion of report of such exposures to a potentially disabling source. Therefore,
their applicability to radiation-induced conditions depends on (I)
the phrasing of the present statutes and (2) the coverage provided
for radiation-induced conditions. If the exposure itself may be
deemed to give rise to a compensable condition,1117 then notice to
the agency from the employer probably could be required under
some existing statutes. 158 However, the phrasing of other statutes
would block coverage of this sort of condition even if it were
deemed compensable.m
It is therefore apparent that under some circumstances the
employer notice provisions may be applicable to radiation-induced
conditions. Such a conclusion is, however, only half a step. The
most important point is that it is equally apparent that such provisions simply were not designed to deal with relatively small exposures to a potentially disabling radiation source. If mere exposure
does not give rise to a compensable condition, none of the statutes
would require reporting. But if it is a compensable condition, it
may differ from "ordinary" injuries in that often only the employer
will know of it. Notice to the employee should be required and the
statute of limitations should be suspended until such notice is
given. Heretofore, those provisions lifting the statute have provided
a rather harsh and unnecessary penalty. In these circumstances,
they would only put the employee in the position in which he
would have been had the employer fulfilled his legal duty.
The second type of provision relevant to this question is that
sometimes included in the recently enacted radiation "industry
safety" laws. 100 Typical form of the notice requirements included
therein is section S(b) of the Model Act for State Radiation Control,161 which provides:
157

For example, it may entitle the employee to retraining expenses.
accidental injuries");

158 E.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-10-27 (1959) ('compensable
STAT. ANN. § 102.37 (1957) ("death or disability').

WIS.

159 E.g., R.I. GEN. LA.ws ANN. § 28-32-1 (1956) requires report of personal injury only
if fatal, incapacitating for three days, or requiring medical assistance.
100 See CCH ATOM. ENERGY L. REP. at 23021-23.
101 State Radiation Control Act, Council of State Governments, Suggested State Legislation-Program for 1961. Somewhat different language from an earlier version of the Model
Act has been incorporated into a number of existing statutes. See CCH ATOM. ENERGY
L. REP. 1J 170311.
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"The (agencies or cite appropriate agency) shall require
each person who possesses or uses a source of ionizing radiation
to maintain appropriate records showing the radiation exposure of all individuals for whom personnel monitoring is
required by rules and regulations of the (agencies or agency).
Copies of these records ... shall be submitted to the (agencies
or agency) on request. Any person possessing or using a source
of ionizing radiation shall furnish to each employee for whom
personnel monitoring is required a copy of such employee's
personal exposure record annually, at any time such employee
has received excessive exposure, and upon termination of employment. " 162
Penalties provided for violation of the section are monetary.
These provisions are not a part of the workmen's compensation
system of the respective states. Nevertheless, their relation to that
system is apparent. Unless otherwise provided, radiation exposure
records could be used by the employee as evidence to support a
claim for compensation as well as for his personal well-being. It is
suggested that states employing such provisions ought to consider
the effect of employer failure to give notice upon the statute of
limitations section of the workmen's compensation act. One suggestion is to create a conclusive presumption of causal connection
if notice intentionally is not given; if unintentionally, perhaps it
would be enough to toll filing requirements.
Summary. The present workmen's compensation systems have
not given adequate consideration to the problem of employer
knowledge of exposure of an employee. Existing statutes suspending the statute of limitations are of dubious wisdom as presently
conceived and are wholly inadequate to deal with the problem
presented by exposure to radiation. Nonetheless, the concept of
requiring the employer to give notice or make a report is not new.
The present systems provide a structure upon which adequate provisions can be framed. The industrial safety laws provisions relating to the use of radiation are of themselves adequate in their requirements of notice to the employee, but their relation to the
workmen's compensation acts must be clarified by legislative action.

D. Specific Injuries and the Statute of Limitations
Probably the vast majority of radiation-induced conditions
will create disability as traditionally conceived. However, some
162

State Radiation Control Act § 16.

1963]

RADIATION INJURIES

297

such conditions will be of a unique character which may itself
create problems with the statute of limitations section of the act.
It may be seriously questioned whether the sundry injuries examined at this point should even be compensable. However, that
question is not within the scope of this inquiry,168 and the discussion proceeds on the assumption that coverage is provided. The
problem examined is whether, assuming coverage, special statute
of limitations provisions are necessary or desirable for the particular
injuries discussed.
Occupational Diseases Requiring Retraining. This possibly
compensable condition has been discussed extensively in the foregoing text and it will therefore be necessary only to recall the main
points of that discussion. If the condition is deemed compensable,
exposure to certain prescribed levels of radiation may entitle the
employee to retraining for an occupation which does not involve
further risk of exposure. The exposure itself should be defined as
a "compensable condition" for purposes of retraining and therefore no special statute of limitation provision would be required
because knowledge of exposure would be equivalent to knowledge
of a compensable condition.
Shortened Life Span. The same reasoning as was applicable to
retraining rights should be applicable to shortened life span. Upon
a certain exposure, the employee's life span is predictably reduced.
The coverage section should prescribe the levels of exposure and
the damages to be awarded. If it is to be treated as a compensable
disability, there would again be no need of any special statutory
limitations provisions other than the regular ones since the condition is suffered on exposure.
Increased Susceptibility to Disease. The same approach might
be taken here because an employee's increased susceptibility theoretically is predictable upon a given exposure. However, in this
instance physical manifestations will occur later if the employee has
actually suffered the injury. Therefore it is arguable that there
should be some delay in order to determine whether or not the
employee has indeed been injured and, if so, the extent of that
injury. On the other hand, probably in this limited field a provision for potential injury claims should be adopted. The reasonably prudent man standard is not readily applicable since it may
be uncertain when a person becomes reasonably aware that he
suffers from increased susceptibility. Hence, it is suggested that
168

See general discussion in

ATOMS AND THE

LAw 199-360.
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filing of a claim should be required upon actual notice of exposure
or upon actual knowledge of the condition, whichever first occurs.
Recovery of damages, however, should be deferred until there is
some physical manifestation.
The incorporation of an actual knowledge provision may be
deemed objectionable by some. Its use is suggested because of the
difficulty of applying the reasonable standards to such injuries. In
most cases it will be the employer's failure to report exposure which
will necessitate reliance on another date. There seems good cause
not to put the employee at a disadvantage because of the employer's
-failure.
Damage to Offspring. Once more there is statistical probability
but there is even more reason to deny recovery until an affected
offspring is born, for only then will the injury definitely be ascertainable. A provision similar to that employed for increased susceptibility should be employed but the reasonable standard should
be used here.
IV.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

From the foregoing review and discussion it is clear that existing
statutory systems are inadequate to cope with many difficulties
which may be raised by radiation-induced conditions. The inadequacy may be of two types. First, some statutes are inadequate as
applied to even "ordinary" conditions. They will necessarily be
inadequate to deal with radiation-induced conditions. What is
needed is a general reform of the statute in the particular area of
difficulty. A good example of this would be the adoption of areasonably-prudent-man knowledge standard applicable to all claim
filing requirements. There is no reason why this standard should
be applied only to radiation-induced conditions. Second, there
are particular problems of inadequacy caused by the nature of
radiation injuries. The key to dealing with these is to recognize the
problems and to enact special provisions to cope with them. A hitor-miss treatment of radiation-induced conditions simply because
they are "different" makes no sense at all. 164 In most cases, these
conditions are not so different as to require exceptional treatment,
and when they are, such treatment can be provided. Hence, we
recommend the following:
164 The Virginia provision removing all requirements for the filing of claims for
radiation-induced occupational disease is an example of an amendment which has little,
if any, reasonable basis. See VA. CoDE ANN. § 65-49 (Supp. 1962).
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1. Maintenance of the present statute of limitation sections to
apply to radiation-induced conditions;
2. Elimination of the "accidental injury"-"occupational disease" dichotomy and provision that all work-connected disabilities
("injuries") be compensable;
3. Provision that all claim filing (with one or two minor exceptions) be subject to a reasonable knowledge standard;
4. Elimination, or revamping along the lines discussed above,
of cutoff provisions for radiation-induced conditions;
5. Special provisions for "unique" radiation-induced conditions along the lines suggested.
Although these recommendations will not solve all the problems
which may arise, they will go a good distance in providing an
adequate basis upon which the agencies and courts may intelligently proceed.

APPENDIX A
EXISTING STATUTE OF LIMITATION PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO RADIATION-INDUCED CONDITIONS

(.)0

0
0

Explanation:
1. "Regular or special": "R" indicates that radiation-induced conditions arc covered under the provisions for all conditions. "S" indicates special coverage for "latent"
and for radiation-induced conditions.
2. "T": indicates a split coverage-in general, rc_gular coverage for filing requirements and special coverage for "cutoff" dates.
3, "X": indicates a lack of a provision or inapplicability of the category to the particular state law involved.
OCCUPATIONAL DISBASB PROVISIONS

JURISDICTION

Regular [R]
or
Special [S]

Alabama
Code
Alaska
Comp. Laws

X

Arizona
Rev. Stat,

R

Arkansas
Stat.

R

California
Lab, Code

R

Colorado
Rev. Stat,
Connecticut
Stat• .Ann,

s

R

R

Delaware
Code .Ann,

R

Florida
Stat. Ann,

R

Georgia
Code Ann,

R

Filing

ACCIDENT OR INJURY PROVISIONS

Cutoff

Regular [R]
or
Special [S]

Only "occupational pneumonoconiosis" covered.
tit. 26, H 313(1)-313(16) (1958)
2 yrs, from knowledge,
None
§ 43-3-41 (9) (Supp. 1959)

R

60 days from disablement.

Total disability within
120 days from last day
of employment, § 23-1107
(2) (1956)
Disablement within 1
yr. of last injurious exosure, § 81-1314(7)
1960)
None

R

§ 23-1224(2) (1956)

2 yrs, from last injurious
exposure. § 81-1318 (1960)
1 yr. from knowledge.
§ 5412 (1953); § 5405
(1953)
3 yrs. from disability. § 81·
18-11 (Supp. 1961)
1 yr, from manifestation
of symptom, § 31-294
(Supp. 1961)
1 yr, from knowledge. tit,
19, § 2361 (c) (Supp.
1960)
2

yrs. from "injury,"
440,151 (1952); § 440.19
(Supp, 1961)
1 yr, from "accident"
(which is read here as
"injury"). § 114-810;
§ 114-305 (1956). Sec 52
S.E.2d 325 (1949).

R

"Accident'' or "Injµry"
and Time Period

Cutoff

Accidcnt-1 yr. tit. 26,
§ 296 (1958)
Same as for occupational
disease,
§
43-3-41(9)
(Supp, 1959)
Injury-I yr. § 23-1061
(1956)

Same
None
None

R

Injury-60 days, ["Notice" to commission.] § 81·
1317 (1960)

R

Accident-1 yr. H 5405,
5411 (1953)

None

R

None

R

Injury-IO days. § 81·13·5
(1953)
Accident-I yr, § 31-294
(Supp, 1961)

(Claim filed) 5 yrs, from
last exposure in employment. tit. 19, § 2361 (c)
(Supp. 1960)
None

R

Accidcnt-2 yrs, tit, 19,
§ 2361(a) (Supp. 1960)

Same

R

lnjury-2 yrs.
(Supp. 1961)

§

440. 19

Same

R

Accident-I yr.
(1956)

§

114-305

Same

f

§

Disablement within 1 yr.
of last exposure, § 114•
801 (1956)

Accidcnt-2 yrs.
81-1318 (1960)

§

Same
Accidcnt-5 yrs.

I 81-13-6 (1953)
Same

Hawaii
Rev. Laws
Idaho
Code

s
s

Illinois
.Ann. Stat.

T

2 yrs. from knowledge.
§ 97-52, Act 11' (1961)

None

s

1 yr. from disability and
knowledge.
§
72·1228
(Supp. 1961)
1 yr. from disablement [R].
tit. 48, § 172.41 (c) (Supp.
1961)
2 yrs. from disablement
[R]. I 40-222S (Supp.
1962)
90 days from knowledge.
I 8SA.12 (Supp. 1962)

None

R

Accident-1 yr. I 72-402
(1949)

Same

S yrs. from Iast exposure

R

.Accident-6 mos. tit. 48,
§ 161 (1950)

Same

s

Knowledgc-2 yrs, I 40•
1224 (Supp. 1962)

None

R

Injury-2
(1949)

85,26

None

R

.Accident-180 days [to em•
ployed. § 44-S20a (Supp.
1961)

Same

R

Accident-1 yr. I 342,185
(1962)

Same

None2

R

.Accident-I yr.; if latent,
two yrs. from accident.
I 23:1209 (1950)

Same

None

R

Accident-I yr. (mar be
extended to 2 irs. if ' mistake of fact' ) • ch. 31,
I 33 (Supp. 1962)

Same

Disablement within l yr.
after last injurious ex•
posure, art. 101, § 23
(1957)
None

R

Accident----60 days unless
"sufficient cause.' art. 101,
I 39 (1962)

R

None

R&S

Same as for occupational
disease, ch. 1'2 §§ 1(7.A),
41 (1957)
Injury-6 mos. This may
be extended to 3 yrs. if
emplorer is ~iven notice
of accident within 3 mos.
and condition is latent.
I 17,165 (1960)

Indiana
Stat• .Ann.

T

Iowa
Code Ann.

s

Kansas1
Gen. Stat. Ann.

s

3 yrs. from last day of
employment. I 44·Sa17
(Supp. 1961)

Kentucky
Rev. Stat.

R

Louisiana
Rev. Stat.

R

Maine
Rev. Stat.

s

Maryland
.Ann. Code

R

1 yr. after last exposure or
after knowledge-whichever
last occurs. I 342,316
(1962)
4 mos. of contraction or
manifestation [to employer], § 23:1031,l (D)
(Supp. 1962)
1 yr. from incapacity or
knowledge-whichever lat•
er. ch. 31, I 63 (19S4)
ch. 31, § 70-A (Supp.
1962)
l yr. of disability. art.
101, I 26 (19S7)

Massachusetts
.Ann. Laws

R

6 mos. from "injury," ch.
1'2, I 41 (19'7 J

R&S

( Same as accident) • I 17•
,16S (1960)

Michigan
Stat. Ann.

(emergence) [SJ. tit. 48,
172.36(£) (Supp. 1961)
Disablement within 2 yrs.
of knowledge [SJ. I 40•
220,Ce) (Supp. 1962)
Condition must emerge
2 yrs. from last exposure.
§ ssA.12 (Supp. 1962)
Disablement within 1 yr.
from last exposure,i § 445a01 (Supp, 1961) No
claim 3 yrs. after event.
I 44-Sa17 (Supp. 1961)
None

Same as for occupational disease, I 97•52 (1961)

§

yrs,

I

Accident-2 yrs.

art. 101, § 39 (1962)
None
None
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0
I-'

c.,o

APPENDIX A (Continued)
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASB PROVISiONS

ACCIDENT OR INJURY PROVISIONS

Regular [R]
JURISDICTION

or

Special [SJ

Filing

Minnesota
Stat. Ann.

R

Mississippi
Code ,Ann.
Missouri
Ann. Stat.
Montana
Rev. ·Code

X

Nebraska
Rev. Stat.

R

6 mos. from "injury."
§ 48-133 (1943)

Nevada
Rev. Stat.

T

4 mos. after disability [R].
§ 617,330 (1961)

New Hampshire
Rev. Stat.

R

New Jersey

R

On!)' notice to employer
required 90 days from first
date of treatment by licensed physician. §§ 281:
16-17 (Supp. 1961)
2 yrs. after exposure ceases
or 1 yr. after knowledge-whichever lattr. I 34:15•34
(1959)
60 days from disablement.
§ 59·11·30(b) (1953)

Stat. Ann.

New Mexico
Stat. Ann.

R
R

R

Cutoff

6 yrs. from disablement.
Disease must have been
§
176.66(1)
(1945);
"contracted" within 12
§
176.151(1)
(Supp.
mos. of disablement.
1961); § 176.011(16)
§
176.66(3)
(Supp.
(Supp. 1961)
1961)
No provision for occupational disease
1 yr. from knowledge.
§ 287.063(6) (1925)
30 days from notice to
employer; notice due 30
days from knowledge. § 92·
1312, § 92-1313 (Supp.
1961)

0
N>

Regular [R]
or
Special [S]

"Accident" or "Inj~"
and Time Period

Cutoff

R

Accident-6 yrs. § 176.151
(1) (Supp. 1961)

Same

R

Injury-30 days (to R).
§ 6998-113 (1942)
Injury-I yr. § 287 .430
(1949)
Accident-12 mos. § 92·
601 (1947)

None

None

R

Total disability within
120 days of last day of
employment; may be extended to 1 yr. for "good
cause." §§ 92-1311 (2) ,
92-1313 (Supp. 1961)
1 yr. from "accident."
[Note Nebraska's liberal
construction reads "accident"
as
"injury."]
§ 48-137 (1943)
Disease must have been
contracted in Nevada
within 4 yrs. of disability [SJ. § 617.440
(1961)
None

R

R

None
Same

Same as for occupational disease. §§ 48-133,·137 (1943)

R

Accident-90 days. "Sufficient reason" may excuse.
§§ 616.500(1), 61G.500(6)
(a) (1961)

Same

R

Only notice to employer 90
days after accident. § 281:
16 (Supp. 1961)

Same

5 yrs. from last exrsure.
34:15-34 (1959

R

Accident-2 yrs.
(1959)

34:15-H

Same

Disablement within 120
days of last day of employment. § 59·11·10(2)
(1953)

R

Notice required to cm1>loyer 60 days from auiiltnt.
§ 59-10-13.4(A) (1953).
Claim re<juired 1 yr. after
employer's failure to pay
timely claim. I 59·10-13-6
(A) (1953)

Same

§

§

CTI

N)

New York
W.C. Law

s

90 days from disablement
& knowledge, I 28

None

R&S

North Carolina
Gen, Stat.
North Dakota
Cent. Code

R

None

R

None

R

Ohio
Rev. Code Ann,

T

Disability within 8 yrs.
after last injurious exposure [SJ. § 4123,68
(Supp. 1962)

R

Injury-2 yrs. I 4123.64
(Supp. 1962)

None

Oklahoma
Stat, Ann,

s

None

R

Injury-I yr. tit. 85,
(Supp. 1962)

I 43

None

Oregon
Rev, Stat.

T

Claim must be flied 7
yrs. from last exposure
[S], § 656.807 (1961)

R

R

None

R

Accident-3 mos,, may be
extended to 1 yr. on ' sufficient cause." I 656,274
(1961)
Accidcnt-16 mos. tit. 77,
§ 602 (Supp, 1962)

Same

Pennsylvania
Stat. Ann.
Rhode Island
Gen, Laws

R&S

None

R&S

1963 amendment not
available for
analysis.

Not available

Not
available

Injury (strict)-2 y_rs. But
for "latent" conditions 2
yrs. from knowledge or
disablement whichever la/er. § 28-35-n (Supp.
1961)
Not available

Same

South Carolina
Code

1 yr. from disability. § 97•
58 (1958)
60 days from "injury."
§ 65-05-01; § 65-01-02(8)
(1960)
2 yrs. from disabili!Y, or 6
mos. from diagnosis1 or 6
mos. from knowleage of
diagnosis (R]. § 4123.85
(Supp. 1962)
1 yr. after manifestation
to one learned in medicine
or last hazardous exposure.•
tit. as, § 43 (Supp. 1962)
180 days from date B was
disabled or information
from physician, I 656,807
(1961)
16 mos, from disability.
tit. 77, § 1415 (Supp.
1961)
24 mos. from disability
but "latent" conditions
have 2 yrs. from knowledge or disability, whichever /a/er. § 28•34-4; I 28·
35·57 (Supp. 1961)
Not available

South Dakota
Code

R

R

Injury-I yr,
(1939)

I 64.0611

None

Tennessee
Code Ann,
Texas
Rev. Civ. Stat,

R

Disablement within 1 yr.
from last injurious ex•
l'OSUre, § 64,0807 ( 1)
(Supp. 1960)
None

R

Accident-I yr, § 50-1003
(1952)
Injury-6 mos, art. 8307,
I 3 (1956)

None

R

T

1 yr. from disablement.
64,0805(21)
(Supp.
1960)

§

1 yr. from incapacity. I 50•
1108 (1952)
6 mos. from manifestation
[R]. art. 8307, § 4a
(1956)

Statute purports to re•
guire "incapacity" within a certain period; ineffective. art, 8306, § 25
, (Supp. 1962)

R

Accident-2 yrs., but same
provision as for OCCUJ'a•
tional disease available for
certain "latent" conditions.
I 2s
Accident-2 yrs. I 97•24
(1958)
Injury-60 days. § 65-05-01
(1960)

Same

Same
None

Same

Not available

None

APPENDIX A (Continued)
.hCCIDBNT OR INJURY PROVISIONS

OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE PROVISIONS
]URISDICTION

Regular [R]
or
Special [SJ

Filing

Cutoff
Total disability within
120 days from last day
of event. § 35-2-13(2)
(1953)
Disablement within 3
yrs, after last injurious
exposure. tit. 21, § 1006

Utah
Code .Ann.

R

60 days from day upon
which cause of action
arises.§ 35·2-48(6) (1953)

Vermont
Stat. .Ann.

R

Virginia
Code
Washington
Rev. Code

s

1 yr. from disablement
( defined as medical apt,).
tit. 21, § 1013; § 1004
(Supp. 1961)
None' § 65-49 (Supp.
None
1962)
1 yr. from date of notice
None
from physician, § 51.28·
,055 (1961)
2 yrs. from last exposure,
Same § 2540 (1961)
§ 2540 (1961)
25 years from injury" [SJ.
2 yrs. from injury or
§ 102.17(4) (Supp. 1962)
knowledge [RJ, § 102.12
(1957)
No occupational disease coverage

West Virginia
Code
Wisconsin
Stat• .Ann.
Wyoming
Stat. .Ann.

R
R

R&S

Regular [RJ
or
Special [SJ

''Accident" or "Injury"
and Time Period

Cutoff

R

.Accident-3 yrs.
(1953)

35·1·99

Same

R

Injury (defined as medical
apt,)~ mos. tit, 21,
§ 656 (1959): § 1004
(Supp. 1961)
.Accident-1 yr. § 65-84
(1950)
Injury (strict)-1 yr. § 51·
.28.050,
§
51,08.100
(1961)
Injury-1 yr, § 2540
(1961)
Injury-2 yrs, [RJ § 102, 12
(1957)

None

R

R
R

R&S

§

Injury-1 yr. Latent injury-I yr, after knowledge, § 27.105 (Supp.
1961)

Same
Same
None
25 yrs. from injury [SJ.

§ 102.17(4) (Supp. 1962)

None

1 KAN. GEN. STAT, .ANN, § 44-5al7 (Supp. 1961) provides that the time limits "of this section" shall not be applicable to radiation-induced diseases, It is unclear whether
"this section" means only § 45-5a17 or refers to the entire occupational disease act as a "section." Therefore, the a_pplicability of § 44-5a01 is uncertain.
• The sole requirement of the statute seems to be notice to tlie employer. There is no clear indication of time limits on either a claim to the commission or emergence of the
condition. This is also the conclusion of a Note, 15 LA. L. Rnv. 870 (1955).
• The statute contains no indication whether or not one of the alternative periods may control the other.
' See note 101 supra and accompanyinli text.
• The probable loose construction of ' mjury" in Wisconsin has been noted. See notes 88-90 supra and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX B
EXISTING STATUTES REQUIRING THE EMPLOYER To REPORT TIIE EMPLOYEE'S CoNDmON
PENAL1Y

JURISDICTION

Alabama
Code
Alaska
Comp. laws
Arizona
Rev. Stat.
Arkansas
Stat.
California
Colorado
Rev. Stat.
Connecticut
Stat. Ann.
Delaware
Code Ann,
Florida
Stat. Ann.
Georgia
Hawaii
Rev. laws
Idaho
Code
Illinois
Ann. Stat.
Indiana
Stat. Ann.
Iowa
Code Ann.

Notice Required
(on Knowledge of-)
All injuries. tit. 26,
Injury or death,
(Supp. 1959)

§
§

266 (1958)
43-3-67(1)

None [Report may be required
by commission. § 23·908 (1956)]
Injury or death. § 81-1334 (Supp,
1951)
Injuries, fatal or otherwise. § 816-1 (1953), Disease apparently
covered. I 81-18·5 (1953)
Injury resulting in incapacity,
I 31-316 (Supp. 1962)
Accident resulting in injury. tit.
19, I 2313(a) (Supp. 1960)
Injury or death. § 44036 (Supp,
1961)
All injuries, I 97-80 (Supp.
1960)
All injuries causing 1 day's
absence. § 72-1001 (1947) Apparently applicable to disease,
§ 72·1202 (1947)
All accidental injuries, tit, 48!
§ 167 (1950), and occupationa
disease, tit. 48, § 172,41 (Supp.
1961)
Injuries causing 1 day's absence,
I 40-1517 (Supp. 1962)
Permanent injury or incapacity
lasting 7 days. § 86.11 (1949)

Monetary
12 mos, or not more than $SOO,
tit. 26, § 324 (1958)
Not more than $500, I 43-3·
67(S) (Supp. 1959)

Effect on Emrloyee
Statute of limitations

Other Provisions

If employer has knowledge, s/1
does not run until report liled.
§ 43-3-67(6) (Supp. 1959)

Report cannot be used in evidence, I 43-3-67 (3) (Supp,
1959)

Not more than $100, I 81-1334
(Supp. 19Sl)

Report cannot be used in evidence, § 81-1334 (Supp. 19Sl)

Not more than $100, § 81-14-26
(1953)

Report is confidential. I 81-6-3
(19H)

Not more than $2SO, § 31-288
(Supp. 1962)
$10 to $50, tit. 19, I 2313(c)
(Supp. 1960)
Not more than $100, § 44036
(Supp. 1961)

Report is not evidence. tit. 19,
2313(d) (Supp. 1960)
Report is not evidence. I 44036
(Supp. 1961)

§

Not more than $100 or 90
days. I 97-80 (Supp. 1960)
Not more than $SOO, § 72-1001
(1947)
$10 to $500. tit. 48,
(Supp. 1961)

§

172,55

Not less than $SO nor more than
$500. § 40-1517 (Supp. 1962)
$SO, § 86.12 (1949)

(JO
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PENALTY
JURISDICTION

Kansas
Gen. Stat, Ann,

Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Rev, Stat,
Maryland
Ann, Code
Massachusetts
Ann. Laws

Effect on Employee
Statute of Limitations

Notice Required
(on Knowledge of-)

Monetary

Any accident, § 44•557 (Supp.
1961), or occupational disease,
§ 44-5a01 (Supp, 1961)

Not more than $500, § 44-557
(Supp. 1~61)

Injury by accident causing Joss
of 1 day's work or requiring
services of physician. cli. 31,
§ 44 (Supp, 1961)
Accident causing disability of
more than 3 days, art, 101,
§ 38(b) (1937)
All injuries. ch. 152, § 19
(1957)
.

Michigan
Stat, Ann;

Injury.

Minnesota
Stat. Ann.

Death or serious injury,
,231 (Supp. 1962)

Mississippi
Code Ann,

Fatal injury or injury causing
Joss of work time. § 6998-34
(1942)
Personal tnJ ury by accident,
§ 287,380(1) (1949)

§

No limits run until employer
files report if employee has given
him notice, But no action can
be brought 1 yr, after accident.
§ 44-SS7 (Supp, 1961)

Other Provisions
Reports cannot be used in evidence against employer. § 44-557
(Supp. 1961)

Not more than $100. ch, 31,

§ 44 (Supp. 1961)

Not more than $SO. art. 101,
§ 38(d) (Supp, 1962)

S/1 will not run until filing by
employer. art, 101, § 38(c)
(Supp. 1962)

Cost of proceedings caused by
failure to report, ch, 152, § 19
(1957)
Employer must have notice of

17,165 (1960)

injury within 3 mos, of accident.
If so, s/1 will not run until he

files. § 17.165 (1960)

Missouri
Ann. Stat.
Montana
Rev. Code
Nebraska
Rev. Stat.
Nevada

§

176-

Accident resulting in fatality or
injury as required by commission.
§ 92-808 (1947)
Accident as required by commision. § 48-144 (1943)

$SO, § 176.231 (Supp, 1962)

Not more than $100.
(1942)

§

(1) Not public. § 176,231
(Supp, 1961) ; (2) Commission
to notify employee, § 176,235
(Supp. 1961)

6998-34

Not Jess than $SO nor more than
$SOO or not less than 1 week
nor more than 1 yr, or both,
§ 287,380(4) (1949)

Report is confidential.
,380(3) (1949)
Report is confidential.
(1947)

§

§

287·

92-809

O')
N)

New
Rev.
New
Stat.

Hampshire
Stat.
Jersey
Ann.

New Mexico
Stat. Ann,
New York
\V,C, Law
North Carolina
Gen. Stat.
North Dakota
Cent. Code
Ohio
Rev, Code Ann.
Oklahoma
Stat. Ann,
Oregon
Rev, Stat,
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
Gen, Laws
South Carolina
Code
South Dakota
Code
Tennessee
Texas
Rev, Civ, Stat,

Utah
Code Ann,

Injury.

§

281:46 (1955)

Occurrence of accident or occurational disease. § 34: 15-96
(1959)
Compensable accidental injuries,
§ 59-10-27 (1959)
All injuries causine; loss of a
day, a shift, or requ1ring medical
treatment. § 110 (1946)
Injury causing more than l day's
absence. § 97·92(a) (1958)
Accident resulting in injury,
§ 65-01-07 (1960)
All injuries or occupational
diseases, § 4123,28 (Supp,
1962)
Accident resulting in injury, tit,
BS, § 102 (1951)
Accident and resulting injury,
§ 656.422 (1961)
Personal injury if fatal, incal'acitating for 3 days, or requuing
medical assistance, § 28-32-1
(1956)
Injury causing absence of more
than 7 days, § 72-501 (Supp.
1960)
Accident resulting in personal
injury, § 64.0505 (1939), Apparently applicable to disease,
§ 64.0802 (Supp, 1960)
Accident resultin'f in injury
causing absence o more than l
day or notification by employee
of disease, art, 8307, § 7
(1956)
Accident resulting in personal
injury, § 35-1·97 (1953)

Not more than $25. § 281:46
(1955)
$10 to $50, § 34-15-101 (1959)
Not less than $25 nor more than
$100. § 59-10-30 (1959)

c.o
O'l

00

Repealed (1931)

Reports not public and may not
be used against employer al law.
§ 34-15-99 (1959)

'--'

If employer has actual notice,
s/1 lifted until 30 days after he
Jiles. § 59·10-38 (1959)

Not more than $500,
Not less than $5 nor more than
$25, § 97·92(e) (1958)
Not more than $500, § 65-01·07
(1960)
Not more than $500, § 4123,99·
(B) (Supp, 1962)

Report is confidential,§ 97·92(b)
(1958)
Report is confidential, § 65-0415 (1960)

Not more than $500, tit, 85,
102 (1951)
$100. § 656.422 (1961)
§

0

z

28-32-2

Report cannot be used in evi•
dence. § 28·32·4 (1956)

Not less than $5 nor more than
$25, § 72-503 (1952)

Report is not public, § 72·504
(1952)

Not more than $50,
(1956)

§

i

Not more than $25, § 64,9901
(1939)

Not more than $1000, art, 8307,
7 (1956)

§

Not more than $500,
(1953)

§

35·1·97

00

0

-....:r

APPENDIX B (Continued)

(jO

0
00

PENALTY
JURISDICTION

Vermont
Stat, Ann,
Virginia
Code
Washington
West Virginia
Code
Wisconsin
Stat, Ann,
Wyoming
Stat, Ann,

Notice Required
(on Knowledge of-)
Injury causing 1 day's absence
or necessitating medical attendance. tit. 21, § 701 (19,9)
All injuries, fatal or otherwise.
§ 6'"115 (1962). Applicable to
disease. § 6,-46 (1949)
Injury.

Other Provisions

Not more than $25, tit. 21,

§ 702 (1959)

Not more than $25,

§ 65-118

(1949)

Report not available to public.
D 65-119 (1949)

Not more than $2500. § 2509

§ 2,40 ( 1961)

Death or disability.

Effect on Emv.loyee
Statute of Limitations

Monetary

(1961)

§

102,37

(1957)

Accident. § 27-107 (19'7)

Not less than $10 nor more than

$100, § 102,35 (1957)
Not more than $500. § 27-108
(1957)

Report cannot be used in evidence, § 102.40 (1957)

